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I. MEDIATION: "THE BETTER WAY"
No official gathering of mediators is complete without one participant
proclaiming in ritualistic style the accepted tenet that mediation is "the better
way." By empowering the participants, mediations produce a high rate of party
satisfaction creating results that last. Although citations are not always provided,
the genesis of this dogma likely stems from the famous study of small claims
court mediations in Maine in the 1980's. I The authors of that study concluded
that the consensual processes of mediation generated greater party satisfaction,
which in turn led to greater compliance. 2 They explained:
Consent, unlike command, brings with it an assumption of responsibility
for the settlement and for its implementation. This sense of responsibility,
along with general normative pressures to live up to commitments can weigh
heavily on disputants, even those who may regret having given consent in the
heat of negotiation or mediation. The more explicit these pressures, the more
effective they are. Our data suggest that the personal and immediate
1 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11 (1984).
2 1d.
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commitments generated by consensual processes bind people more strongly to
compliance than the relatively distant, impersonal obligations imposed by
authorities.
3
While some have questioned these conclusions, 4 it remains a working
assumption that mediation produces high party satisfaction and settlements that
last.
Court-connected mediation processes have flourished. 5 Although the focus
in the mediation process on facilitation, self-determination, and conciliation
might appear inconsistent with the essence of adversarial justice, the judicial
system's predominant concern about docket control provides a strong
overlapping zone of interest. In the last decade, facilitators were not only invited
to the party, but asked to sit at the head of the adversarial table. The number of
mediations multiplied as courts happily sent parties to private mediators never to
see the case again.6 Few disputes involving mediations were reported in
published opinions. The dearth of contested cases supported the notion that
parties enthusiastically comply with mediated settlement agreements. Empirical
studies further reinforced the belief that mediation participants came away from
mediations happy, compliant, and satisfied. 7
3 Id. at 44 (citation omitted); see also Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation andAdjudication in
the Small Claims Court, The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 323, 354 (1995) (concluding that "differences in the effectiveness of mediation versus
adjudication are due [to the differences in the two processes]").
4 See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 85 (observing that "the notion that Americans who believe they
have a legal claim prefer to resolve such claims through mediation rather than adversarial
litigation and adjudication seems to be based on questionable assumptions and debatable
extrapolations from other social conflict context"); Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A
Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical Investigation, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
515, 515 (1984) (suggesting as an alternative conclusion that the high compliance rates
result from the fact that defendants have at least partially admitted to some liability in these
settlements); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1358 (1994) (suggesting that
satisfaction or settlement rates are not a reasonable indicator of the quality of a particular
process).
5 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
407, 415-21 (1997) (providing a "Brief Intellectual History of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Legal Ethics").
6 Court-connected mediation of family law cases raises specialized issues and are not
specifically addressed in this Article.
7 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 885, 886 (1998)
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Recently, however, reports of disgruntled, or at least disappointed,
participants in court-connected mediation processes have increasingly found
their way back into the litigation process. 8 In the last few years, a half-dozen state
supreme courts, 9 hundreds of lower courts, and numerous legal scholars 10 have
addressed the issues raised when the consensual process of mediation creates
disharmony rather than acquiescence and peace. In addition, nearly all of the
energy and debate leading to the approval of the Uniform Mediation Act
centered on questions of privilege and confidentiality of mediation sessions as
mediators throughout the country took seriously the prospect that their
mediations would become the source of additional litigation. " I
(analyzing empirical research on the parties' satisfaction in mediation processes); Barbara
McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical
Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376, 392 (1997) (concluding that "research
consistently shows such increased satisfaction, particularly when litigants use the mediation
process").
8 See Duane W. Krohnke, Mediation's CaseAppearancesAre More Frequent in 1998,
17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LmG. 1, 1 (1999) ("As mediation use increases, its
appearance as the subject of litigation rises as well. Last year, mediation continued moving
from a tangential issue in court cases to the object of the suits.").
9 Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind. 2000) (refusing to enforce an oral
agreement reached during a mediation because of court rules of confidentiality); Haghighi v.
Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927, 928-29 (Minn. 1998) (refusing to enforce a
written mediation settlement document signed by the parties and attorneys because it did not
comply with a state statute that required written mediation settlement agreements to state that
they are binding); Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001) (refusing to enforce a
mediated settlement agreement absent agreement on the terms of the release), reh'g denied,
553 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 2001); Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Roseland, 619 N.W.2d 230, 234-
36 (Neb. 2000) (enforcing a signed mediated settlement agreement that called for a general
release); Golding v. Floyd, 539 S.E.2d 735, 736-38 (Va. 2001) (refusing to enforce a signed
"settlement agreement memorandum" that was expressly made "subject to [the] execution of
a formal agreement consistent with the terms herein"); Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger,
457 S.E.2d 36, 41 (Va. 1995) (enforcing an oral agreement in settlement negotiations that
contemplated a subsequent execution of a formal, written "Mutual Release and Settlement
Agreement"); Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 809 (W. Va. 2002) (refusing to enforce
an alleged agreement drafted by the mediator when it did not address disputed terms relating
to the scope of the release).
10 See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the
Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 172-73 (2001); Ellen E.
Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides with
Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 35 (2001); Steven Weller, Court Enforcement of
MediatedAgreements: Should Contract Law be Applied?, 31 JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 13;
Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court Connected Mediation:
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001).
11 See generally Michael B. Getty, The Process of Drafting the Uniform Mediation Act,
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The increased litigation does not in any way foreshadow the demise of
mediation as an empowering consensual process. Nor does it refute the claim that
mediation is "the better way." Some increase in litigation by disappointed parties
to mediations would be expected simply because of the substantial increase in
the number of legal systems adopting mediation as a required part of the pre-trial
process. 12 Nonetheless, increased litigation by dissatisfied mediation parties is
not a good thing. Just as party satisfaction may be grounds for claiming the
process is a good process, increased resort to the courts to provide relief from the
fruits of a consensual mediation process may reflect a need to more closely
scrutinize the process.
Although court-connected mediations are part of a highly structured
litigation process that carefully spells out rights and duties through numerous
rules of procedure, the mediation process has been largely unregulated. The
mediation community has been effective in convincing the courts and regulators
to keep their hands off the emerging ADR processes in order to maximize
individual choice, creativity, flexibility, and of course, finality. A few
jurisdictions provide specific direction usually crafted in facilitative language, 13
but typically mediators are given only general direction. 14 Courts simply hand off
the case to privately retained mediators, asking them to be neutral and not
coercive but to extract a settlement. Courts then draw a wall of confidentiality
22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 157, 157-58 (2002) (describing the history of the Uniform Mediation
Act).
12For example, in 1999, Florida had approximately 125,000 court-connected
mediations. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 10, at 172 n.4 (quoting Kimberly Ann Kosch,
Compendium of Florida-Court Sponsored Arbitration and Mediation Programs (2000)).
13 See N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (providing that
"[t]he mediator's role is to facilitate communication and recognition among the parties and
to encourage and assist the parties in deciding how and on what terms to resolve the issues in
dispute"); see also FLA. R. FOR CERT. AND APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.310, which provides:
(a) Decision Making. Decisions made during a mediation are to be made by the parties.
A mediator shall not make substantive decisions for any party. A mediator is
responsible for assisting parties in reaching informed and voluntary decisions while
protecting their right of self-determination. (b) Coercion Prohibited. A mediator shall
not coerce or improperly influence any party to make a decision or unwillingly
participate in a mediation. (c) Misrepresentation Prohibited. A mediator shall not
intentionally or knowingly misrepresent any material fact or circumstance in the course
of conducting mediation. (d) Postponement or Cancellation. If, for any reason, a party
is unable to freely exercise self-determination, a mediator shall cancel or postpone a
mediation.
Id.
14 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.02(7) (providing that "[a] mediator may not
impose his or her own judgment on the issue for that of the parties").
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around the process and hope the case goes away. 15 The mediator is free, within
extremely broad limitations, "to work her magic" 16 on the participants, establish
the rules of the process, and then to use these rules to trash, bash, or hash out a
settlement. 1 7
This Article advances the thesis that the number of recent cases and the
nature of the claims by parties complaining about their experiences in court-
connected mediations suggest that it is time to reassess the courts' role in
supervising and regulating the mediation processes that judges have incorporated
into the pre-trial process. The dissonance between the mediation community's
aspirational goals for a conciliatory process and the judicial system's singular
focus on settling cases has not assured a fair process. 18 The courts' reluctance to
supervise the mediation process, for fear that it will become less efficient in
getting rid of cases, creates a virtually unregulated enclave of adversarial activity
within a process loosely defined as conciliatory and facilitative. This dissonance
can create, and has created, both confusion and an unfair process.
The traditional method of policing the bargaining process through
substantive contract law is not adequate to assure fair processes in court-
connected mediations. Substantive contract principles were developed based on
the model of private, adversarial negotiation, which is dramatically different from
the context of conciliatory mediation. Therefore, substantive principles of
contract law must recognize and accommodate the different context of the
mediation process. In particular, the role of the court-appointed mediator, who
controls the communications and engages in sophisticated techniques in an effort
15 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("In short,
courts may try to use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and increase court efficiency
at the possible cost of realizing better justice.").
16 See generally John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use andAbuse, 29 LoY. U. CHi.
L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (examining the "magic in mediation" in an attempt to determine the ethical
limits of a mediator's use of deception to solve problems).
17 See generally James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing it Out: Is This the End
of Good Mediation?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-72 (1991) (describing the range of
accepted mediator styles by categories of mediators who trash, mediators who bash, and
mediators who hash things out).
18 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues,
No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REV.
407, 408 (1997) (noting that "the romantic days of ADR appear to be over... [rather than]
its promise of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity, we now see the need for ethics,
standards of practice and rules"). But see Lela Porter Love, Mediation: The Romantic Days
Continue, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 735, 743 (1997) (replying that "[t]he romantic days of
mediation continue because of the paradigm it embodies; its underlying values and vision are
as compelling and laden with potential as ever").
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to convince the parties to drop their adversarial masks, makes the context of
mediations unique. Finally, the penchant for confidentiality and secrecy,
resulting in overlapping privilege rules, makes it difficult for parties to litigate
claims of unfairness in the mediation process. Certainly, the courts should be
open to those mediation participants who claim rights or defenses generated in
court-sanctioned processes. Legitimate concerns about confidentiality or other
bright-line rules should not totally deprive participants the opportunity to raise
basic claims of unfair treatment.
Relying on lawsuits to police mediation practices, however, will not assure
fair procedures in court-connected mediations. Courts must explicitly regulate
and supervise the process as well as supervise the private citizens serving as
court-appointed mediators. Initially, the courts need to be clear about the goal of
the mediation process and work to insure that the mediators act in ways
consistent with this goal.
In crafting the goals and ground rules for court-connected mediation, the
courts must reconcile the judicial system's goals of efficient and fair resolution
of disputes through a highly structured, adversary system with mediations' core
values of conciliation, party empowerment, and voluntary self-determination. 19
All parties, as well as the mediator, should know what is expected of them at a
court-connected mediation. The desire to win by seeking every permissible
advantage through adversarial argument, persuasion, and intimidation is deeply
imbedded in the hearts and minds of participants in the litigation process. If the
courts actually intend to compel parties to act in a cooperative, facilitative
manner in the midst of this adversarial contest, the courts' expectations must be
clear, and effective methods must be established to retrain the thought processes,
practices, and expectations of those who choose to, or are compelled to,
participate in the Anglo-American civil trial process.2 0 It is more realistic to
design the process carefully, clearly delineating the expectations and limits of
adversarial conduct.
19 See Alfini, supra note 17, at 75 (asking "[h]ow the goals and demands of a
consensual, non-adversarial process can be reconciled with those of the highly adversarial
context in which it is injected").
20 Thumb screws, cattle prods, and electric shock therapy might be a bit harsh, but
adversarial instincts will not easily be obliterated.
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11. ENFORCING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Is Mediation a Step in the Adversary Process or an Alternative
Approach to Resolving Disputes?
When mediation participants resort to litigation to enforce "rights" derived
from a mediation process created by the court system, the courts must confront
the basic issue about the nature of this ADR process: Is dispute resolution in the
context of a mediation sufficiently different from the context of private
negotiation or a judicial settlement conference to justify different substantive
rules relating to enforcement? While both adversarial negotiation and mediation
processes resolve disputes, the essence of the mediation process is that the parties
voluntarily determine their solution. 21 In judicial settlement conferences and
private negotiations the parties also make choices concerning whether they will
settle, but the context of these "negotiations" are dramatically different from
mediations.
Academics have written volumes on the place of mediation in the dispute
resolution spectrum.22 Most agree that the process of mediation was designed as
a very different alternative to adversarial dispute resolution. Certainly, the rapid
growth of the ADR movement was fueled in large part by a rejection of the
adversariness and inflexibility of the litigation process. 23 Courts and legislatures,
on the other hand, have readily accepted mediation, not necessarily because of an
interest in self-determination, but because cases settled with little effort or
expense by the judicial system.24 The overlapping interests in resolving disputes
cemented the marriage between the ADR community and the judicial system,
despite what might appear to be differing values.
Public officials looked to the ADR community to provide both the
intellectual leadership and the language describing and prescribing the process.
21 See generally Welsh, supra note 10, at 3 ("Ethical codes for mediators describe party
self-determination as the 'fundamental principle of mediation."').
22 See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation, The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71,71-72 (1998); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and
Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 30 (1982); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediator's
Orientations, Strategies and Tactics: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7,
11 (1996); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 985-86 (1997).
23 See Welsh, supra note 10, at 15 ("Much of the support for mediation was rooted in
dissatisfaction with the legal system's perceived mistreatment of disputants."); see also
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 6 (describing the ADR movement as motivated by a
concern that "dispute resolution should more fully involve the participants in disputes").
24 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 3-13.
516
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Of course, the process was described in facilitative, party-empowering terms. But
in practice, the judicial system's bottom-line focus has prevailed in providing an
expedient, rights-based process focused on settlement. 25 As the mediation
process has become institutionalized, or perhaps even swallowed up in the
machinery of adversarial justice, principles of flexibility, cooperation, and
empowerment may have been compromised. Commentators have remarked that
the mediation process in court-connected mediations has been "hijacked by
lawyers." 26 This reflects a "tale of legal innovation co-opted," 27 leading to
nothing more than "a traditional bilateral negotiation session attended by a third
party or a 'glorified' judicial settlement conference. '28
B. Should Traditional Principles of Contract Law Be Applied to
Mediation Settlements?
The extent to which court-connected mediation is simply a traditional
negotiation with a stranger present29 or truly is an alternative process for
resolving disputes becomes less of a theoretical question when the fruits of the
process become the subject of additional conflict and litigation. If asked to
enforce or reform an alleged agreement reached during mediation, the courts
initially must determine what substantive legal principles should be applicable. If
the mediation process is simply a private bargaining process, traditional contract
principles applied to private negotiations should also be applied to settlements
arrived at during mediation. However, if the process is an institutionalized part of
the pre-trial litigation process, perhaps courts should take into account unique
25 See Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and
Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 703, 711 (1997):
The style most frequently acknowledged publically [sic] by mediators is the
facilitative style. But the reality is that if mediators are actually practicing a form of
mediation that is not facilitative, and if, in fact, it is more evaluative, then the
profession of mediation is doing a disservice to the public by espousing one style while
practicing another.
Id.
26 Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-
Connected ADR, 6 DtsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15.
27 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 1.
28 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got
to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788 (2001) (quoting John Bickerman, Great
Potential: The New Federal Law Provides Vehicle, If Local Courts Want to Do More on
ADR, 6 Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 3, 5); see also Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research
at the Crossroads, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 71, 76 n.23; Hensler, supra note 26, at 15-17.
29 See Welsh, supra note 28, at 796.
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aspects of the court-mandated mediation process, in particular, the mediator's
power to extract, facilitate, influence, or coerce agreement.
This issue frequently arises in the context of concerns about confidentiality.
Courts, legislatures, and most commentators are quite willing to treat mediation
differently from private negotiation when it comes to preserving privacy or
confidentiality in mediations. 30 Privacy and confidentiality are highly valued pre-
conditions to successful mediation practices. The concern for confidentiality in
settlement negotiation is not unique to the mediation process. The confidentiality
of private settlement agreements has long been protected by the courts.
31
The evidence rules protecting the confidentiality of settlement negotiations,
however, include numerous exceptions. 32 There is general agreement that these
evidence exceptions, designed for arms-length bargaining discussions in
adversarial sessions, do not provide adequate protection for discussions in
mediation. 33 Legislatures, 34 rulemaking bodies, 35 and common law judges36
30 See generally Deason, supra note 10, at 38-42 (discussing legislative and rule
making efforts to protect confidentiality in mediation).
31 See FED. R. EvID. 408 (providing that offers of compromise and statements in
compromise negotiations cannot be admitted into evidence).
32 See id. (providing that statements made in settlement negotiations cannot be admitted
in subsequent trials to prove liability, but could be offered for impeachment or bias).
33 See, e.g., Richard Chemick, Confidentiality in the Mediation Process, CA13 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 603, Jan. 1996, at 606 (1996); Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator
Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (1988); Alan Kirtley, The
Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, The Process and the Public Interest,
1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 ; Michael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons
from the Civil Justice Reform Act, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1995); Michael L.
Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON
HALL LEGIS J. 1, 3-7 (1988); Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality:
Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157, 164-65
(1994); Symposium, Critical Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Confidentiality in
Mediation, An Annotated Bibliography, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57, 62 (1988). But see
Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation
Procedures in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 102 (1999) (arguing that Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 provides sufficient protection in mediations); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View
of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 36 (1986) (suggesting that with
a minor amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides adequate protection for
confidentiality in mediation).
34 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4, reporter's note, at 2(a) (2003) (discussing privilege
granted in section 4(b) of the Uniform Mediation Act that prevents disclosure of certain
information); SARAH R. COLE, ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 9:10 (2d ed.
2001) (discussing statutory confidentiality privileges); see also Deason, supra note 10, at 40
(listing statutes and concluding that "most states recognize the importance of mediation
[Vol. 19:2 20041
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agree that confidentiality concerns in mediations are more pressing than the
concerns for confidentiality in private settlement negotiations, requiring more
extensive protection and particularized rules.
When it comes to enforcing settlement agreements obtained in a mediation,
however, there is a working assumption that mediated agreements should be
treated no differently than settlements obtained by private negotiation, despite the
differing contexts. Disputes over mediated settlement agreements clearly raise
issues not present in private negotiations. Even under the view that a mediation is
simply a negotiation with a stranger present, this "neutral stranger," who is not
part of the adversary dispute, must be accounted for. Some modification in the
law relating to enforcing negotiated settlements must be implemented to account
for the role and effective power the neutral has on the parties and the language of
any agreement. 37 The neutral may be a stranger, but the mediator is not a
"passive" observer and can have a dramatic influence on the shape and language
of agreement.
As discussed in Part VII, mediators play major roles in orchestrating,
facilitating, or influencing settlements. For example, mediators will use their
status and their skills to encourage the parties to let down their adversarial guard
and confide in the mediator. This unique role of the mediator as trusted confident
is largely responsible for the enhanced concern for confidentiality or privilege
that has been readily accepted by legislators and rulemakers. 38 But when the
issue is enforcement of agreements, courts, legislators, and commentators tend to
disagree about whether mediation settlement agreements should be treated
differently from settlement agreements reached through bilateral negotiation.
confidentiality and have enacted some form of protection").
35 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.08(a) (2002) (providing a broad privilege for
"any fact" concerning the process).
36 See, e.g., NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51, 51-54 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding a public
policy justification for precluding a federal mediation and conciliation service mediator from
testifying in a labor dispute); Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513 (W.D.
Pa. 2000); Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S. Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (applying
a common law mediation privilege based on the policy of an enacted statute that was not yet
in effect).
37 For example, as a general principle of contract construction, ambiguous language is
construed against the drafter. Traditional rules of interpretation must be modified when the
mediator drafts the agreement or suggests the language that is adopted.
38 See Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?: Mediation's
"Value-added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 3-6 (1996) (discussing
how a mediated settlement negotiation differs from private negotiations).
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACH
A. Contract Law Applied to Mediation Settlements
Judges uniformly agree, usually without discussion, that the basic principles
of contract law should be applicable to disputes involving the enforcement of
mediation agreements. 39 Sponga v. Warro40 is one of the few cases to discuss the
issue of whether the context of mediation requires special consideration in cases
enforcing a settlement agreement. In Sponga, the Florida District Court of
Appeals found that the interest in finality justified a heavier burden on a party
arguing that unilateral mistake should negate a settlement reached in mediation. 41
The court reasoned that mediation, like arbitration, has a strong emphasis on
finality.42 According to the court, this interest in finality makes mediations
"especially unsuited for the liberal application of a rule allowing rescission of a
settlement agreement based on unilateral mistake." 43
Comparing the conciliatory mediation process to arbitration is unusual, as is
the focus on finality in mediation. The court said nothing about the interests of
self-determination. Clearly this court was looking at mediation through the lens
of the litigation system.
In Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest v. Doe,44 the Oregon
Court of Appeals reviewed a holding that settlements reached in mediations
merited special consideration.45 The trial judge viewed the issue from the
39 See Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Roseland, 619 N.W.2d 230, 233-36 (Neb. 2000)
(treating a purported mediated settlement agreement as a contract); Chappell v. Roth, 548
S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001) (applying contract principles to a mediated settlement
agreement), reh 'g denied, 553 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 2001); Golding v. Floyd, 539 S.E.2d 735-38
(Va. 2001) (applying contract principles of construction to a mediated settlement agreement
memorandum); Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39 (Va. 1995) (applying
contract law to determine whether a mediation memorandum of agreement was enforceable).
40 Sponga v. Warro, 698 So.2d 621, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see also Tilden
Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange County Expressway, 816 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ('There is a more stringent standard of review, however, when the final
judgment to be vacated follows a mediated settlement agreement."); Wright v. Brockett, 571
N.Y.S.2d 660, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (refusing to enforce a mediated settlement
agreement between an unrepresented tenant and landlord absent a showing it was not
coerced borrowing procedures followed in housing court).
4 1Sponga, 698 So. 2d at 625.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Doe, 903 P.2d 375, 378 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), modified
by, 908 P.2d 850 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
45 Id. at 378.
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perspective of mediation's core value of self-determination, rather than from the
adversary system's interest in finality. Therefore, the judge refused to enforce a
settlement agreement that was signed by defendant's lawyer with full
authorization from the defendant, 46 because "the process of mediation is
bottomed on the premise of voluntariness." 47 Consequently, standard contract
law was inapplicable and any mediation agreement should not be binding until
reduced to writing, agreed upon, and signed by the parties.48
The Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed, however, stating that there is "no
authority that supports the proposition that settlements reached during mediation
should receive special treatment or be analyzed differently from settlements
reached in other settings. '49 The court applied standard contract law coupled
with traditional agency rules to bind the defendant to this contract signed by his
lawyer.50 Again, this court appeared unconcerned about mediation's core value
of self-determination.
The Oregon Court of Appeals was correct in its assessment of the status of
the law. For example, each of the state supreme courts that have addressed
enforcement issues have applied, without discussion, general contract law
principles. 51 However, the Oregon trial judge is also correct that the mediation
process, aimed at "voluntariness" or self-determination, raises different concerns
from traditional contract principles that focus on objective manifestation of
assent, community standards, and finality.
B. Objective Manifestation ofAgreement vs. Self-Determined Agreement
Under traditional contract law principles, agreements reached in mediation
are enforceable if there is mutual assent about the material terms of the
agreement. Mutual assent is sometimes expressed in terms of a "meeting of the
minds," 52 which sounds like a subjective inquiry into what the parties actually
intended. Traditional contract law however, requires an objective inquiry to
determine whether the communications and actions of the parties manifested
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Kaiser, 903 P.2d at 378.
50 Id. at 378-83.
51 See supra note 9.
52 Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499,500 (N.C. 2001) (stating that "for an agreement to
constitute a valid contract, the parties' 'minds must meet as to all the terms"') (citation
omitted), reh 'g denied, 553 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 2001); Riner v. Newbraugh 563 S.E.2d 802,
804 (W.Va. 2002) (stating that "a meeting of the minds of the parties is the sine qua non of
all contracts").
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mutual assent. 53 The "making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two
minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs-not
on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same
thing."54
The parties do not have to reach explicit agreement on all terms, but the
essential terms of the contract must be reasonably certain. "The terms of the
contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining... the
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 55 If the court is
satisfied that the parties manifested an intent to be bound, the court can provide
the terms of contract. Under the authority and influences of the Uniform
Commercial Code56 most gaps in the terms of an agreement, other than
quantity,57 can be filled by the court by reference to course of performance,
course of dealings, usage of trade, and commercial reasonableness. 58
Furthermore, once a contract is entered into, it will not be set aside absent a
showing of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress, or undue influence. 59
53 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d ed. 1999).
54 Grimsley v. Inverrary Resort Hotel, 748 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting Robbie v. Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985)); see also Computer Network
v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669,675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that "while
a few cases ... speak in terms of 'meeting of the minds' . . . the actual holdings are
consistent with the theory of objective manifestation of assent").
55 Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Fick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981)).
56 See U.C.C. § 2-208 (2000). Under the revised Uniform Commercial Code however,
the substance of this provision is found in section 1-303 (2003).
57 See U.C.C. § 2-204 (2002) cmt. subsection 3, which provides:
If the parties intend to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection recognizes that
agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any reasonably certain basis
for granting a remedy based on commercial standards of indefiniteness. Neither
certainty for what the parties were to do nor a finding of the exact amount of damages is
required. Neither is the fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough by
itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. This Act makes provision elsewhere
for missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the like.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
58 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003) (supplying a "reasonable price" when there is an
open price term); U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (2003) (supplying a "reasonable time" when there is no
time for performance specified).
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981); see also Coulter v. Carewell
Corp., 21 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (stating that "a settlement agreement
'constitutes a contract between the parties which should not be set aside absent fraud, duress,
undue influence, or mistake"') (quoting Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196,
1198 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998)).
[Vol. 19:2 2004]
ENFORCING RIGHTS
Settlements derived from mediations are treated the same as negotiated
settlement agreements. 60 Of course, within the framework of general contract
law, settlement contracts receive special treatment by the courts. Because
settlements conserve resources and make less work for the courts, they are highly
favored by judges. 61 Perhaps some judges favor settlements to encourage self-
determination by the parties, but rarely is this cited as a reason for enforcing
settlements. 62 Consequently, there is a type of presumption that assumes the
validity and enforceability of settlement agreements ending litigation. 63 This
presumption of validity is applicable to settlements derived from mediations as
well.64 Parties claiming that a purported settlement agreement should not be
enforced have an uphill battle. Furthermore, settlement agreements in court-
connected mediations frequently become part of a court order or judgment.65
Seeking relief from, or enforcement of, a court order or judgment raises
substantive and procedural issues that may not be present in most contractual
litigation. Many courts have summary procedures in place for the enforcement of
settlement agreements in litigated cases.66 Finally, a likely remedy for breach of a
60 See, e.g., W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.14 (providing that a written mediation settlement
agreement is enforceable in the same manner as a written contract).
61 See Robbie v. Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985) (stating that settlements are
highly favored and will be enforced wherever possible).
62 Butsee Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001), reh'g denied, 553 S.E.2d
36 (N.C. 2001). The court stated:
[W]e recognize that settlement of claims is favored in the law, . . . and that mediated
settlement as a means to resolve disputes should be encouraged and afforded great
deference . . . [but] given the consensual nature of any settlement, a court cannot
compel compliance with terms not agreed upon or expressed by the parties in the
settlement agreement.
Id. (citation omitted); Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802,809-10 (W. Va. 2002) (agreeing
that the law "favors and encourages settlement," but should only enforce agreements that are
"fairly made and not in contravention of some law or public policy").
63 See, e.g., In re Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Tex. App. 1993) (enforcing a
repudiated settlement agreement extracted during a mediation in the face of a statute that
seemed to allow for repudiation).
64 Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36,39 (Va. 1995) (noting that "the law
favors compromise and settlement of disputed claims") (quoting Bangor-Punta Operations,
Inc. v. Atlanta Leasing, Ltd., 207 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Va. 1974)).
65 See, e.g., IND. ALTERNATIVE DiSp. RESOL. R. 2.7 (E)(2) (providing that mediated
settlements be reduced to writing, signed, and filed with the court along with a stipulation of
disposition); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 11; W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.14.
66 See COLE, ET AL., supra note 34, § 4-13 (discussing provisions for summary
enforcement); Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of
The Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 265, 270 (2002) (discussing provisions
for summary enforcement of mediated settlements in early versions of the Uniform
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settlement agreement is specific performance, where in a typical contract action
the norm is an award of expectation or actual damages.
While the substantive principles of contract law may distinguish between
settlement agreements and other contracts, usually no distinction is made
between mediated settlements and negotiated settlements. Applying contract
formation principles developed in the context of adversarial, arms-length
bargaining to the consensual mediation process creates some difficulty for the
courts. Searching for an objective manifestation of mutual assent in a process
designed for facilitation and self-determination can result in separate trips in the
same journey.
C. Agreements, Agreements to Agree, or No Agreement at All
Whether an agreement in fact has been reached is the most common issue in
the cases addressing enforcement of mediation settlement agreements. These
cases raise two related but separate questions that tend to get jumbled together.
First, did the parties manifest an intent to agree; second, is the agreement
sufficiently definite that the terms can be enforced by a court? The issues
overlap, of course, because the lack of definite terms may be objective evidence.
that the parties did not yet intend to be bound. 67
These issues are particularly difficult for a court to resolve when the alleged
agreement is oral, and the parties have no tangible, executed writing to show to
the court. Rather than focus on the written language, the trial judge must work
through conflicting testimony with differing recollections of what was said. Even
where a writing is produced, courts have difficulty determining whether an
agreement was reached absent an examination of the context of the negotiation.
The writing may reflect only a preliminary agreement or an agreement on only
some of the material terms. Frequently, parties sign documents contemplating
additional negotiation and a more formal draft of an agreement that would not be
binding until subsequently considered, agreed upon, and executed by the parties.
For example, in Chappell v. Roth,68 the parties agreed in writing to a specific
dollar amount in exchange for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice and a "full
and complete release, mutually agreeable to both parties." 69 When the defendant
subsequently insisted on a "hold harmless" clause in the release, plaintiff refused.
Mediation Act); see also Raphael v. Raphael, 817 So.2d 462, 465 (La. Ct. App. 2002)
(enforcing mediated settlement agreement by summary proceedings).
67 FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, §§ 3.7, 3.8.
68 Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001), reh'g denied, 553 S.E.2d 36
(N.C. 2001).
69 Id.
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After substantial litigation, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
parties had not agreed on all the material terms.70
Courts apply general contract law principles that distinguish between valid
mediated settlement agreements that contemplate a subsequent formal writing to
memorialize the agreement and tentative agreements that are "subject to"
executing a subsequent writing.7 1 In Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger,7 2 the
Virginia Supreme Court enforced a mediated settlement that was initially agreed
to by the plaintiff, who subsequently refused to sign the formal settlement
papers.73 But in Golding v. Floyd,74 the Virginia Supreme Court refused to
enforce a signed written "Settlement Agreement Memorandum" that was
expressly made "subject to" the execution of a formal agreement. 75
The proof problems associated with this issue are not unique to the
mediation context. The agreement to agree raises difficult factual and legal issues
in the context of non-mediated negotiations as well. Because of the consensual
nature of the mediation process, the unique role of the mediator, and the added
privilege issues limiting access to proof, these issues are extremely difficult to
resolve fairly in the context of mediations.
The West Virginia Supreme Court struggled with these issues in Riner v.
Newbraugh.76 After an "unsuccessful mediation conference, '77 the parties and
70 Id.
71 See Inwood Intern. Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 243 F.3d 567, 2000 WL 1720676 at
*5 n.3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 2000) (unpublished) (enforcing a mediated settlement agreement
that contemplated subsequent formal documents and releases); Berland v. Miller, No.
A099061, 2003 WL 1875463, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2003) (enforcing a "Full
Settlement" agreement that contemplated a subsequent signing of "a more complete
agreement"); In re Estate of Knopf v. Knopf, No. 238377, 2003 WL 356430, at *2 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2002) (enforcing a settlement agreement that contemplated a subsequent
"comprehensive" agreement being drafted); Lee v. Rosen, Newey & Von Blon, No. 14-00-
00759-CV, 2002 WL 1953791, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 22, 2002) (enforcing a mediated
settlement agreement that contemplated future delivery and execution of formal settlement
documents but was not made "subject to" the execution of these documents); West Beach
Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 261 (Tex. App. 2002) (concluding that the jury
could find an agreement was reached despite the parties contemplating future negotiations
and a more formal agreement).
72 Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36, 40-41 (Va. 1995); see also
Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Roseland, 619 N.W.2d 230, 235 (Neb. 2000) (enforcing a
memorandum settlement agreement that contemplated executing subsequent settlement
documents).
73 Snyder-Falkinham, 457 S.E.2d, at 40-41.
74 Golding v. Floyd, 539 S.E.2d 735, 738 (Va. 2001).
75 Id.
76 Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 805-06 (W.Va. 2002).
77 Id. at 804. Because no settlement was reached the court characterized the mediation
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the mediator followed up the mediation with subsequent telephone
conversations.78 Eventually the mediator believed the parties reached an
agreement and drafted a Mediation Settlement Agreement. 79 The mediator
signed the agreement as did the Riners. 80 Newbraugh subsequently refused to
sign and drafted a more detailed agreement. When the Riners refused to sign the
more detailed agreement, Newbraugh brought a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement. 81 After two hearings involving extensive mediator testimony, the trial
judge ordered the Riners to sign Newbraugh's agreement. 82
Despite the mediator's testimony that the parties agreed to this settlement,
the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed. 83 The court recognized that oral
settlement agreements were enforceable, but concluded that there was no
"meeting of the minds" as to material terms in this case. 84 The court expressed
concern about the mediator testifying, but suggested that mediators could testify
on the issues of whether an agreement had been reached as well as its terms,
without disclosing "confidential" information. 85
Riner is a prime example of how the consensual process of mediation,
designed to reduce conflict, can create conflict, add expense to the process, and
strain the courts' ability to provide a fair resolution. In addition to typical
evidentiary issues about the negotiation, mediations are draped in layers of
confidentiality and privilege rules. 86 Before addressing the merits of any claim
that an agreement was reached, courts and parties must confront these ambiguous
and frequently inconsistent rules of privilege and confidentiality to determine
conference as unsuccessful. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 805.
80 Id.
81 Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 805..
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 809.
85 Id. at 808-09.
86 See Deason, supra note 10, at 38:
Almost all jurisdictions recognize the importance of confidentiality for mediation,
even though it is protected to varying degrees. Some of these protections are
incorporated into state evidentiary rules; others are found in statutes that govern
mediation. There is also an abundance of state rules and statutes limited to court
annexed mediation or designed for particular mediation programs that protect
confidentiality.
Id.
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what evidence is available about the context and content of the alleged
agreement. 87
Asking a court to enforce a mediated settlement agreement raises other
problems not necessarily present in private contract disputes. In most contractual
disputes, past dealings, trade usage, and part performance tend to shed light on
the legal relationship created by oral or written exchanges. When disputes arise
about whether a matter was settled in court-connected mediation, the alleged
agreements tend to be wholly executory and often with little past experience
between the parties to provide guidance in interpretation. Further, gaps in
agreements between parties in the community are readily filled by imposing
reasonable terms, through course of performance, course of dealing, usage of
trade, or custom.88 Applying community or reasonable standards in contract
settings reflects a view that a judicially-imposed resolution consistent with
external community standards is acceptable. However, imposing external
community standards in a mediation setting conflicts with mediation's promise
of self-determination. In theory, parties to a mediation should be free to decide
for themselves what type of agreement is acceptable, free from constraining
community standards. 89
D. Duress/Undue Influence-Mediation Style
Mediation participants are complaining to the courts about unfairness in the
mediation process, raising traditional contract defenses based on fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress. A disturbing aspect of this trend is the number of
87 Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework for Self-
Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 251, 251 (2002) (stating that "[t]he law governing the
confidentiality of mediation is currently a mess"). Although the stated purpose of the
Uniform Mediation Act is to "create uniform rules to increase predictability, simplicity and
self-determination," the focus of the act is on secrecy and privilege. UNIF. MEDIAION ACT
prefatory note (2003). Privilege rules make it more difficult for courts to resolve subsequent
conflict accurately and fairly, thus sacrificing self-determination in some cases to advance
other policy considerations considered more valuable. See generally Scott H. Hughes, The
Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 23 (2001)
(arguing that the drafters of the act favored mediator confidentiality over self-determination).
88 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
89 See Love, supra note 18, at 740 (noting that in mediation, "the values, preferences,
and priorities of the parties should govern the outcome ... in sharp contrast to an outcome
which reflects the likely court ruling, societal norms, or the neutral assessment of a fair or
just result"). But see Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness
Concerns, 1990 J. Disp. Resol. 347, 368 (suggesting that in evaluating fairness of a mediated
settlement, "[t]he benchmark... is whether the agreement approximates or improves upon
the probable adjudicated outcome").
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claims focusing on the mediator as the source of unfairness. To some extent,
these claims of mediator unfairness may be encouraged by the confidentiality and
privilege rules that tend to be much looser when the mediator is accused of
wrongdoing. 90 If there is a claim the mediator participated in unfairness,
mediator testimony becomes central to the fair resolution of the dispute. In a
caucus-based mediation, where the communications are channeled through the
mediator, what the mediator said or represented on behalf of the other party is
essential to determining whether the agreement was entered into fairly.
Recent cases raise concerns about the proper practice for mediators. The
increase in the number of litigated cases may reflect more aggressive tactics by
neutrals as mediators become more intensely involved in extracting a settlement.
Many of the duress cases involve allegations of dire predictions or "threats" by
the mediator about the consequences of not entering into a settlement
immediately. 91 Of course, a mediator should not "threaten" a party or "coerce" a
settlement, but there is continuing debate and controversy about the extent to
90 See McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 809-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling
that the claim that the mediator pressured a party into signing the agreement waived the
mediator privilege); see also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(5) (2003) (providing an exception
to the privilege rules for claims of professional misconduct against the mediator); Hughes,
supra note 87, at 67 (predicting that lawyers will choose to join mediators as parties to get
around the privilege limitations in the Uniform Mediation Act).
91 Florida set up a forum to hear complaints about mediator misconduct and discovered
that parties were unhappy with perceived aggressive mediator tactics crossing the line from
providing information and "pointing out" possible outcomes to threats and coercion. See
Welsh, supra note 10, at 37 n.153 (describing specific cases before the Florida Mediator
Qualifications Board); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 963 (1997) (suggesting that mediators avoid evaluative behaviors).
Florida's court rules allowed mediators to "point out" possible outcomes of the case but
"under no circumstances ... offer a personal or professional opinion as to how the court in
which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute." FLA. CT. MEDIATION R. 10.090(d)
(1992) (repealed 2000). The Florida rules were amended to allow mediators to provide
information if the mediator is qualified by training and experience to point out possible
outcomes and discuss the merits of a claim, but not to predict how the court will resolve the
dispute. Id. at 10.370(a), (c) (2003). The mediator must maintain impartiality and self-
determination. Id. The rules also require the mediator to advise the parties of their right to
seek counsel when the mediator believes a party does not understand their rights. Id. at
10.370(b) (2003); see also Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation:
Concerns About the Nature and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 267, 279-82 (2001) (addressing the Florida experience); Robert B. Moberly, Ethical
Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 702 (1994) (same).
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which mediators should offer information, opinions, or predictions. 92 While
scholars debate the issues, the subtle differences between offering information,
giving opinions, evaluating, predicting, influencing, threatening, and coercing
may be lost on the parties, and perhaps poorly understood by many mediators.
The unwanted evaluations in these cases tend to be combined with procedural
concerns, usually through extended sessions that have the effect, if not the intent,
of wearing down the will to resist.
Some of the cases suggest that a mediator's zeal to extract a settlement
creates an insensitivity to obvious health concerns. For example, in the now-
famous California case Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.,9 3 the mediation began
between 9:00 and 10:00 A.M. and lasted until an agreement was signed between
midnight and 1:00 A.M. the next morning. 94 Ms. Olam, a sixty-five year old
woman, suffered from high blood pressure, headaches, and intestinal pains.95
She claimed to be upset because she was excluded from participating in most of
the mediation.96 Both her lawyer and the mediator predicted that if she went to
trial, she might lose her house with no chance to get it back.97 She settled.98
When Ms. Olam tried to set aside the agreement on several grounds, including
undue influence, the magistrate concluded she did not state a prima facie case
justifying relief.99
In Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine,100 plaintiff sought to set aside a mediation
settlement agreement reached after an eight-hour mediation session. 10 1 The
plaintiff maintained that the mediator threatened to tell the judge that she caused
the settlement failure. The mediator also gave legal opinions, including a
92 Compare Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1997) (arguing that giving advice, making assessments,
stating opinions, proposing a fair or workable solution, or pressing parties to accept a
particular position is "inconsistent" with the role of the mediator) with James H. Stark, The
Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, 77
from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 784-85 (1997) (concluding
that the distinction between giving legal information and legal advice is not a useful one for
lawyer mediators). See generally Levin, supra note 91, at 271-86 (addressing practices and
court rules attempting to distinguish proper from improper opinions of mediators).
93 Olar v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
9 4 Id. at 1142, 1144.
95 Id. at 1142.
96 Id. at 1142-44.
97 Id. at 1143-44.
98 Id. at 1144.
99 Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
100 Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
101 Id. at 1096.
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prediction that the court would rule against her, opinions about the affect on
pensions, and her potential legal costs. 102 The court ruled that these allegations,
if proven at trial, would be grounds to set aside the agreement. 10 3
In Randle v. Mid Gulf,104 the appellant, who was on heart medicine, tried to
set aside a mediation settlement agreement by claiming that despite chest pains
and fatigue, he was told that he would have to continue in the mediation session
until he was willing to reach agreement. 10 5 The court concluded that these
allegations created a fact issue for the jury. 106
In Golden v. Hood,10 7 plaintiff asked to set aside a mediation agreement
signed by plaintiff, defendant, attorneys for both parties, and the mediator. 1
08
Plaintiff, who was suffering from depression related to the accident in question,
maintained that his psychological state made him susceptible to duress and
misrepresentation. 109 He maintained that his lawyer, the defendant's lawyer, and
the mediator all ganged up on him, insisting that he would get only a limited
recovery at trial." 0 His attorney threatened to resign if he did not accept the
settlement. 1 Although the court concluded that plaintiff s allegations did not
establish a prima facie claim of duress, it analyzed the alleged predictions under
a misrepresentation theory. 112 Ultimately, the court concluded that the trial
predictions were not inaccurate, they were not "false assertions," and the
settlement was fair. 113
These cases make it difficult for the courts to provide a fair resolution to
issues created in processes the courts endorse but rarely supervise or examine. In
court-connected mediations, the parties are participating in a public, highly-
regulated, adversarial process presided over by a judicial officer responsible to
the public. The parties are then asked or forced to participate in a private, largely-
102 Id. at 1097.
103 Id. at 1099-1100.
104 Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *2 (Tex. App.
Aug. 8, 1996).
105 Id.
106 Id.
.107 Golden v. Hood, No. E 1999-02443-COA-MR3-CV, 2000 WL 122195, at * 1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2000).
108 Id. at *1.
109 Id.
110 Id.; see also Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1998) (enforcing a mediated settlement agreement despite claims that the agreement
was the result of threats and lies by the mediator, the third party, and the plaintiff's attorney).
IIl Golden, 2000 WL 122195, at *2.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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unregulated, consensual process, usually presided over by private citizens or
lawyers essentially responsible to no one. 114
Resolving the issues created in these conflicting and confusing processes by
resorting to traditional contract theory is difficult. For example, a mediation is a
consensual process where parties should make decisions free from coercion and
pressure. However, traditional contract analysis tolerates a fair amount of
"bargaining pressure" from the parties before courts are willing to upset an
apparent agreement, particularly an agreement settling a litigated dispute. 115 To
avoid an agreement on the grounds of duress, the proponent must establish a
wrongful threat that deprived the party of free choice. 116 If the claim is economic
duress, courts use an objective test: whether there was a reasonable alternative to
giving in to the wrongful threat. 117 Finally, courts will grant relief only where
there is some unfairness in the result or some type of unjust enrichment. 118 These
concepts, developed in the context of bilateral bargaining relationships, are not
easily adapted to a mediation process that is premised on self-determination, not
a manifestation of assent. 119 Furthermore, the law of duress was not developed in
the context of neutrals trained and motivated to influence parties to reach
agreement.
Because most mediations are private, it is difficult to determine what goes on
behind the closed doors. However, a few court decisions have reported wrongful
threats in mediation. For example, parties have complained about threats of
criminal prosecution to coerce a one-sided settlement. 120 In Randle, the plaintiff
114 Iln some jurisdictions, fledgling ethical boards are attempting to regulate mediator
behavior. See supra note 91 for a description of the Florida experience. In egregious cases,
appeals to the court might result in relief to the parties.
115 See Welsh, supra note 10, at 68-79 (discussing settlements obtained by coercive
practices in judicial settlement conferences).
116 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.2, at 40 (rev. ed. 2002); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § i75(1) (1981); see also Advantage Properties, Inc.
v. Commerce Bank, 242 F.3d 387, 2000 WL 1694071, at *4 (10th Cit. 2000) (unpublished
table decision) (stating that under Kansas law there must be a wrongful act or threat that
obtains consent without volition).
117 See PERILLO, supra note 116, § 28.2, at 41.
1181d. at 42.
119 See Love, supra note 18, at 738 (maintaining that mediation, which is premised on
facilitation and self-determination, belongs in a different paradigm from adjudication); see
also Welsh, supra note 10, at 59-60 (arguing that mediation's concept of self-determination
contemplates voluntary party participation and is different from contract law's focus on free
will assent).
120 See, e.g., Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that a spouse's threat to have her husband arrested if he did not agree to what appeared to the
court to be an unequal property settlement was grounds for setting aside the agreement). But
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claimed duress when the mediator would not let him leave without settling the
case, despite chest pain. 121 In most of the reported cases raising issues of duress,
however, the party is complaining more about predictions involving how ajudge
or jury might decide a case or the implications to a party if they lost at trial. ' 22
These predictions or evaluations could hardly be deemed to be a wrongful threat
under traditional contract analysis.
The concept of wrongfulness may come into play when the prediction comes
from, or is endorsed by, the mediator. Many commentators have argued that it is
improper for mediators to provide opinions about what might happen in court
and that mediators should not be involved in evaluations of the participants' legal
cases. 123 In theory, some court rules support this concept of mediation. 124 In
jurisdictions with well-developed rules regulating mediators, the predictions or
threats become wrongful if they violate mediator conduct standards. 125 In most
jurisdictions, the standards for mediator conduct are so vague that it might be
impossible to tell if they were violated. But even if a court would agree that a
mediator's evaluation is a "wrongful threat" because it violates mediator conduct
standards, that does not make out a case for avoiding a contract based on duress.
Under duress analysis, the court must focus on whether the wrongful threat
left the party with a reasonable alternative, such as actually proceeding to trial.
Although the driving force behind the ADR movement may be to avoid a trial, it
would be unusual for a court to conclude that a party accepted a settlement offer
cf. FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (finding no duress caused by
reference to criminal implications when the matter had already been referred for prosecution
by other government agencies and the mediator simply raised the matter for discussion).
121 Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *2 (Tex. App.
Aug. 8, 1996).
122 See Hensler, supra note 4, at 98 (criticizing the mediator technique of reciting a
"parade of horribles" about the trial process designed to "[wear] down parties' resistance to
settling").
123 See supra notes 91-92.
124 See, e.g., FLA. CT. MEDIATION. R. 10.370(c):
Consistent with standards of impartiality and preserving party self-determination
however, a mediator may point out possible outcomes of the case and discuss the merits
of a claim or defense. A mediator shall not offer a personal or professional opinion as to
how the court in which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute.
Id.; N.C. PROF'L. COND. MEDIATORS R. 5(B) ("[A] mediator may make suggestions for the
parties' consideration. However at no time shall a mediator make a decision for the parties,
or express an opinion about or advise for the parties, or express an opinion about or advice
for or against any proposal under consideration.").
125 See Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(addressing the issue of allegedly improper trial predictions by the mediator under a theory
of mediator misconduct and violation of court rules governing mediator conduct).
532
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because the alternative of going to court and participating in a fair trial is an
unreasonable alternative. 126 Finally, the court must also assess whether the threat
resulted in unjust enrichment or an unfair bargain. 127 If the actual settlement is
within the broad range of reasonable settlements, the settlement should be upheld
under contract theory, even if exacted by coercive pressure.
The traditional duress defense does not account for the role of the mediator.
If the alleged wrongful threat comes from a third-party like a mediator,
traditional contract law provides that the agreement is not voidable if the other
party to the transaction acted in good faith, had no reason to know of the coercive
threats, and gave value to, or relied materially on, the transaction. 128 If the
mediator wrongfully threatens one party in a private caucus, the other party may
not ever know about the wrongful threat. Thus, a mediator may threaten
improperly or manipulate a party's interests in self-determination, yet there is no
relief under traditional principles of duress unless the adverse party can be tied to
the misconduct.
The context of a mediation creates an atmosphere where parties may be
vulnerable to coercive pressures, particularly when the party's attorney wants the
client to settle. Attorneys who cannot convince their clients to accept a settlement
that they believe is reasonable frequently seek out a mediator to serve as a
"reality check" on the client. 129 The attorney and mediator then essentially gang
up on the client to "persuade" or "influence" the client to voluntarily accept the
settlement. The practice is effective in settling cases because few laypersons can
withstand the pressure from both their lawyer and the neutral mediator.
Additionally, it is efficient and consistent with acceptable practices in the
adversary system. Nonetheless, it may seriously infringe on the principle of self-
determination. Traditional duress principles would provide a pressured party no
relief if the "threats" come from the party's lawyer 130 and the mediator, not from
126 See PERILLO, supra note 116, § 28.2, at 41 (explaining that under traditional
principles of duress, if the threatened person could have obtained prompt and adequate relief
in court, no claim for duress could succeed).
127 Id. at 42.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) (1981).
1 29 Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact ofRule 114
on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 429-30 (2002)
(reporting that 57.7% of lawyers representing individual clients said that they chose
mediation because it provided a "needed reality check for [their] client[s]").
130 See In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tex. App. 1994)
(concluding that threats of a party's attorney cannot be attributed to duress caused by the
adverse party); see also Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp. 2d 1110, 1141 n.46
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (complaining of threats by lawyer); McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d
806, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (complaining of unfair pressure from adverse counsel,
the mediator, and her counsel); Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196, 1198
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the adverse party. Furthermore, if both the mediator and the lawyer believe the
settlement is fair, it likely is within the range of settlements the courts would find
acceptable as well.
Professor Welsh has argued that when dealing with mediator misconduct, the
doctrine of undue influence might be the better legal theory to protect the
fairness of the process. 131 Undue influence requires a relationship of domination
by the mediator with regard to a party or some reasonable basis for a party to
believe that the mediator "will not act in a manner inconsistent with [the party's]
welfare."' 132 Mediators make representations that they are neutral and can be
trusted with confidential information, but they frequently inform the parties that
as neutrals they do not assess or guarantee the fairness of any settlement. 33
Parties are usually told that it is totally up to them to voluntarily decide what they
are willing to agree to in a settlement. On the surface, it may be patently
unreasonable for a party to believe that the mediator is concerned at all about
whether the settlement offer is fair. The reality is that some neutrals become
concerned about the welfare of the parties and others do not.134
In some jurisdictions, undue influence might require proof that a person who
has obtained a confidence has taken unfair advantage of that confidence. 135
According to Joseph M. Perillo, "[t]he foremost indicator of undue influence is
an unnatural transaction resulting in the enrichment of one of the parties at the
expense of the other."136 A party would have a difficult time proving that a
mediator is receiving an unfair advantage by getting the parties to settle. 137 Also,
(Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (complaining of attorney, mediator, and third party threats); Golden
v. Hood, No. E1999-02443-COA-MR3-CV, 2000 WL 122195, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
26, 1996) (complaining of attorney's threats).
131 Welsh, supra note 10, at 84.
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (1981).
133 In Minnesota, mediators may be required to inform parties that, "the mediator has no
duty to protect [the parties'] interests or provide them with information about their legal
rights." MINN. STAT. § 572.35(1) (2002).
134 See, e.g., Robert Dingwall & Gale Miller, Lessons from Brief Therapy? Some
Interactional Suggestions for Family Mediators, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 269, 270 (2002)
(suggesting that divorce mediators have difficulty maintaining neutrality in the face of
participant distress).
135 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 2003).
136 PERILLO, supra note 116, § 28.10, at 63.
137 See generally Berg v. Bregman, No. B 149130, 2002 WL 31256677, at *8 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 8, 2002) (refusing to set aside a mediated settlement agreement because of undue
influence by the party's attorney, in part because there was no evidence of any unfair
advantage the attorney received).
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if the persuasion comes from a third-party, like a mediator, the agreement cannot
be avoided if the adverse party gave value without notice of misconduct. 138
E. Fraud/Misrepresentation
Fraud and misrepresentation are traditional defenses to a contract
enforcement action and have been raised in cases where the agreement was
reached during mediation. Initially, the party asserting the defense must establish
that the adverse party made a misrepresentation of fact on a material issue. 139 As
a general rule, statements of opinion or predictions do not qualify as
representations of fact. 140 Statements of opinions and predictions are hard to
categorize as true or false, and rarely is a person reasonable in relying on these
types of statements.
Parties asserting the defense must also establish that they acted reasonably
when they relied upon the misrepresentations. 141 If the party can readily verify
the accuracy of a misrepresented fact, the party usually is not reasonable in
relying on the representation. As with other contractual defenses raised in
connection with a mediation agreement, this defense is complicated by
overlapping rules relating to confidentiality. Some mediation privilege statutes
and rules make an express exception for evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation, 142 and some do not. 143 Even in a jurisdiction where privilege
rules would allow evidence on these issues, the elements of fraud are difficult to
establish in court-connected mediations.
Courts, and a large portion of the mediation community, believe that
notwithstanding the emphasis on candor in mediation, parties should not
reasonably expect the adverse party, or for that matter the mediator, 144 to
138 See PERILLO, supra note 116, § 28.10.
139 See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 4.10, at 244 (describing the common
law contractual defense of fraud).
140 Id. § 4.11.
141 Id. § 4.14, at 255-56.
142 See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(7) (2003) (providing an exception to the
parties' privilege for traditional contract defenses).
143 See Brown v. Brown, No. 03-01-00520-CV, 2002 WL 1343222, at *4 n.5 (Tex.
App. June 21, 2002) (rejecting evidence of what transpired during the mediation); Vick v.
Waits, No. 05-00-01122-CV, 2002 WL 1163842, at *3 (Tex. App. June 4, 2002)
(acknowledging that parties can maintain an action for fraudulent inducement of a mediated
settlement agreement but precluding evidence of the alleged misrepresentation made during
mediation because of privilege rules).
144 Some mediators, particularly lawyers, may have professional obligations not to
intentionally misrepresent facts, at least when representing clients. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1999). Some jurisdictions have ethical codes for mediators that
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represent facts truthfully or accurately. For example, in Chitkara v. New York
Telephone Co.,145 the plaintiff in a discrimination claim tried to have an
agreement set aside based in part on misrepresentations by the mediator.
According to the plaintiff, the mediator harangued him into settling by exhorting,
"Mr. Chitkara, Come on! What are we doing here? You have no case! This case
belongs to the trustees of the bankruptcy court" and stating that the only way
plaintiff would ever "see a dime" was if he "agreed to the mediated settlement
then and there."' 14 6
After agreeing to the settlement, plaintiff was advised by bankruptcy lawyers
that the mediator's statement was false. 147 Plaintiff s claim would not have been
affected by the bankruptcy. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that
plaintiff could not show justifiable reliance and could not succeed on a
misrepresentation claim. 148 According to the court:
The nature of mediation is such that a mediator's statement regarding the
predicted litigation value of a claim, where that prediction is based on a fact
that can readily be verified, cannot be relied on by a counseled litigant whose
counsel is present at the time the statement is made. 149
The prefatory note to the Uniform Mediation Act 150 further advances the
view that although candor is encouraged, truth telling is not necessarily expected
in mediations. Parties must be ever vigilant and verify all important
statements. 151 In theory, most assertions in court-connected mediations could be
might impose this obligation. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app. Code of Ethics, R. 5. ("A
neutral shall not knowingly make false statements of fact or law").
145 Chitkara v. New York Tel. Co., No. 01-7274, 2002 WL 31004729, at **2 (2d Cir.
Sept. 6, 2002), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003); see also Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 994
P.2d 911, 915-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to attribute the mediator's mistaken
representation of policy limits to the adverse party).
146 Chitkara, 2002 WL 31004729, at **1.
147 Id.
148 Id. at **2 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(2)).
149 id.; see also In re Patterson, 969 P.2d 1106, 1110-11 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting claim of fraud in part because the party had no right to rely on a representation of
value when the party could have had an appraisal).
15 0 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note 1 (2003):
Although it is important to note that mediation is not essentially a truth-seeking
process in our justice system such as discovery, if the parties realize that they will be
unable to show that another party lied during mediation, they can ask for corroboration
of the statement made in mediation prior to relying on the accuracy of it.
151 Under the Uniform Mediation Act, parties could testify about mediation
communications relevant to contractual defenses if the court determined the necessity for the
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verified in the pre-trial discovery process. Consequently, notwithstanding the
mediator's efforts to encourage candor, it may be unreasonable for a party to
believe that "candid" statements made by the adverse party, or for that matter the
mediator, are truthful. 1 52
F. Mistake
Many unhappy parties to mediation have unsuccessfully attempted to defend
against the enforcement of a settlement agreement by claiming mistake. Rarely
have appellate courts refused to enforce an otherwise valid settlement agreement
based on the defense of mistake. 153 Raising the defense, however, along with
claims of fraud and duress, may expand the scope of available evidence and
encourage the courts to disregard claims of confidentiality or mediator's
privilege. 15
4
To void an agreement based on mistake, the proponent usually must establish
a mutual mistake 155 as to an existing, material fact that serves as a "basic
evidence substantially outweighs the interest of confidentiality. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT
§ 6(b)(2) (2003). The mediator retains a privilege, however. See id. § 6(c). Thus, a party
could claim that a mediator made a false representation in a private caucus on behalf of the
adverse party and the mediator's testimony might be unavailable. Id.
152 Some have argued that there should be a duty of good faith imposed on parties to
mediations. See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested,
Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 575,620 (1997) (concluding
that by legislation, court rule, or ethical code, mediation parties and lawyers should be
required to abide by some type of good faith or meaningful participation standard);
Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for
Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 961-64 (2001) [hereinafter Kovach, New Wineskins] (arguing for
an ethical rule imposing an obligation of good faith).
153 But see DR Lakes Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A., 819 So. 2d 971,974-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (remanding for factual determination of whether a clerical error in the settlement
document of $600,000 was a mutual mistake); Boardman v. Boardman, No. C7-02-974,
2002 WL 31867759, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2002) (aff'mning the lower court's
decision to amend a mediated settlement agreement based on mistake).
154 See Cain v. Saunders, 813 So. 2d 891, 894 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (finding privilege
rules inapplicable on the issue of whether fraud or mistake affected the settlement); Feldman
v. Kritch, 824 So. 2d 274, 276-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing evidence, including
mediator testimony about mediation communications on the issue of mutual mistake); DR
Lakes, 819 So. 2d at 974 (ruling that the mediation privilege statute was not applicable in a
case involving the defense of mistake). But see Eisendrath v. Super. Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d
716, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (applying privilege rules that precluded testimony about
mistake).
155 A mutual mistake is one that is "common to both parties." Magowan v. Magowan,
812 A.2d 30, 35 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (citation omitted); Breiter v. Breiter, No.
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assumption" of the agreement. 15 6 Further, the proponent cannot void the contract
if the proponent has assumed the risk of the mistake, such as in cases where the
product sold is labeled "as is."' 157
Sheng v. Starkey Laboratories, Inc. 158 demonstrates the difficult burden a
party has to bear to successfully void a settlement agreement based on mistake.
While defendant's motion for summary judgment was pending, the parties were
ordered to mediation. 159 The court decided to grant defendant's motion and
signed it, but did not enter the order, and mailed copies to counsel on a Friday.
Before receiving the court's order, the parties settled at a mediation. 160 The judge
subsequently withdrew the summary judgment order and refused to void the
settlement agreement in response to defendant's claim of mistake. 161 First, the
court ruled that the mistake was simply an error about the value 62 of the claim
and did not go to the very nature of the agreement. 163 According to the court,
even after successful summary judgment motions, claims have some settlement
value. Second, the defendant assumed this risk by choosing to settle, knowing
full well the summary judgment motion was pending. 164
Obtaining relief based on mutual mistake is difficult, but successfully
claiming unilateral mistake is nearly impossible. While it may be possible to void
a contract based on unilateral mistake of a basic assumption, the proponent must
establish that enforcing the contract would be unconscionable or that the adverse
party had reason to know or somehow caused the mistake. 165 Further, the
proponent must prove that he has not agreed to accept the risk or the risk should
FA990720705S, 2003 WL 549062, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2003) (citation omitted).
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981); see also Sheng v. Starkey
Labs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that any mistake justifying
rescission "must go to the very nature of the deal").
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981); see also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 53, § 9.3, at 628.
158 Sheng, 117 F.3d at 1084.
159 Id. at 1082.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1084.
163 Id.; see also Taylor's Nursery, Inc. v. Baylor Boys, Inc., No. C002-134, 2003 WL
223334, at ***3 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2003) (stating that mutual mistakes must comprise
the essence of the agreement to be successful).
164 Sheng, 117 F.3d at 1084.
165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
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not reasonably be allocated to him. 16 6 Thus, relief from an agreement based on
unilateral mistake is rare. 167
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. Settlements in Mediations Require Different Rules
Many state legislatures have recognized that settlement agreements obtained
in mediations raise different concerns than bilateral negotiated settlements. Some
state statutes provide explicit requirements for the enforceability of mediated
settlements without relying on common law principles of contract law. 168 In
some types of mediations, a statute may preclude any court enforcement of a
mediated settlement absent affirmative steps by the parties indicating a desire to
make the agreement enforceable. 169 In the context of these disputes, a judgment
is made that if the settlement agreement breaks down, the parties should again
mediate the dispute rather than look to the courts to enforce rights. In the context
of court-connected mediation, the interest in finality would likely militate against
this approach. As an alternative approach to protect against overreaching in the
mediation process, some states have passed consumer-type cooling off statutes,
allowing parties a period of time to rescind any mediation agreement. 170
Legislation frequently limits the enforceability of mediated settlement
agreements by restricting access to proof through privilege rules.171 For example,
the Uniform Mediation Act makes oral mediation settlement agreements
unenforceable indirectly by creating a complicated set of privileges and rules of
166 See id. §§ 153, 154.
167 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 9.4, at 631; see also Ghahramani v. Guzman,
768 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that unilateral mistake cannot be a
defense to the enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement).
168 See COLE ET AL., supra note 34, § 4:13 (discussing various statutes that alter the
common law approach for enforcing mediated settlement agreements).
169 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 467.4(a) (Deering 2003) (providing that an
agreement "shall not be enforceable in a court nor shall it be admissible as evidence in any
judicial or administrative proceeding," unless the contract "includes a provision that clearly
states the intention of the parties that the agreement ... shall be so enforceable or admissible
as evidence"); MINN. STAT. § 518.619(7) (2002) (providing that mediation settlements in
child custody disputes are not enforceable unless the parties and their counsel consent to
present it to the court and the court adopts it).
170 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.82(c) (West 2003) (providing a three day right of
rescission for the insured parties in earthquake insurance mediations); FLA. CT. FAM. L. R.
12.740(f) (2003) (providing a 10 day right of rescission for parties in family mediation).
171 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Michie 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452(a)
(1994); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9(c)-(e) (West 2000).
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confidentiality that preclude disclosure or testimony about oral agreements. 172
Many states directly require some type of executed writing before a mediated
settlement agreement can be enforced in court, 173 reinventing a statute of frauds
for mediation.
Some legislation moves beyond mandating a signed writing, requiring that
the agreements include specified clauses or "magic words." 174 Through court
rules, several states require that an agreement reached in court-connected
mediation "shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their
counsel, if any". 175 To be enforceable in Minnesota, a mediated settlement
agreement, if in writing, 176 must include certain boilerplate warnings, including
language that this written settlement agreement is binding. 177
172 See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 6(a)(1) (2003); see also infra, note 241.
173 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-302(2.5) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-235(d)(b) (West 2003); IND. ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. R. 2.7(E)(2); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.023(c)(1)-(4) (West 2003).
174 See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 1123 (Deering 2002) (providing that a written
mediated settlement agreement can be admissible if the "agreement provides it is
admissible," "enforceable," or contains "words to that effect"); TEx. FAM. CODE. ANN.
§ 6.602(b)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2003) (providing that a mediated settlement
agreement is enforceable if it contains a "prominently displayed statement that is in boldface
type or capital letters or underlined that the agreement is not subject to revocation; is signed
by each party to the agreement; and is signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present at
the time the agreement is signed.").
175 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b) (2003); see also IND. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. R.
2.7(E)(2) (2003); MEDIATED SETTLEMENT. CONF. R. 4(C) (2002).
176 Compare Vo v. Honeywell, Inc., No. C3-97-1393, 1998 WL 15909, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 1998) (enforcing an oral settlement agreement reached during mediation), with
Schwartz v. Adamson, No. C8-98-1416, 1999 WL 170676, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. March 30,
1999) (refusing to enforce an oral settlement agreement where a written agreement
memorializing the settlement was not signed).
177 MINN. STAT. § 572.35, (1) (2002). The requirement can be satisfied if somebody
(probably the mediator) advises the parties of these rights. See Haghighi v. Russian-Am.
Broad. Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Haghighi II1]; Haghighi v.
Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd, 173 F.3d
1086 (8th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Haghighi I]; Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577
N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998) (answering certified question from Haghighi v. Russian-Am.
Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir 1999))
[hereinafter Haghighi II]; see also James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, The Haghighi
Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Casting a Pall
Over the Development of ADR in Minnesota, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 299, 324
(1999) (arguing that the insistence on technical terms in mediated settlement agreements
contrary to community expectations creates uncertainty in whether mediation settlements are
enforceable "casting a pall over the development of ADR in Minnesota").
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B. Return to Formality-Return to the "Seal"
The focus on technical formality as a requirement for enforceability in court
is reminiscent of the early common law requirement that agreements were
enforceable only if under seal. The seal and other contract formalities
traditionally served channeling and cautionary functions, 178 limiting judicial
discretion. In theory, when issues were brought before a court, the bright-line
rules made it easy for courts to determine when to intervene in these private
disputes. Thus, the rules were designed to encourage bargaining parties to act
with care and also to reduce litigation and conflict. Of course, the focus on
technical formality led the courts away from any concern about fair treatment or
protection of the parties' legitimate expectations or reliance interests.
In part to avoid the unjust consequences that would result from not enforcing
fair agreements that lacked the proper formality, the standards became more
relaxed over time. For example, courts would accept substitutes for the formal
wax seal. 179 Eventually, the personal signature took the place of the formal
seal.180 Courts and legislators opted for judicial flexibility in deciding whether
contracts were intended to be enforceable and whether they should be enforced,
rather than preserving a ritual that was no longer effective in a literate,
commercially-developed society. 181
The return to technical formality, although perhaps consistent with an
emerging trend, 182 appears totally inconsistent with mediation's stated goals of
flexibility and self-determination. On the other hand, limiting access to the courts
by resorting to technical bright-line rules may well reflect the ADR community's
continued distrust and disdain for the litigation process that fueled the
contemporary ADR movement. 183 The attempt to manage access to the courts
178 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 2.16, at 86-87; Lon Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
179 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:4, at 66 (4th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter WILLISTON].
180 FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 2.16, at 86.
181 See id.; ERIC MILLS HULMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 10.18, 417-18 (rev. ed.
1996); WILLISTON, supra note 179, § 2.4, at 66-68.
182 Legislatures throughout the country have enacted statutes limiting access to courts if
certain formalities are not met. See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of
Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 258 (1995) (addressing the increased recognition of the
value of form in contract enforcement); see also Phillippe v. Shappell Industries, Inc., 743
P.2d 1279, 1289-90 (Cal. 1987) (noting legislative trends in consumer contracts reinventing
the statute of frauds), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011 (1988).
183 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 417 ("At its best, ADR was intended to
provide more creative, particularized, flexible and participative solutions to problems than
the more traditional and adversary legal system could offer."). Courts on the other hand,
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through technical rules may reflect a concern that modern contract principles
premised on an arms-length bargaining relationship do not adequately protect the
interests of the participants in the mediation process. The renewed focus on
formality may be fueled in part by an interest in clarifying or limiting litigable
issues to ensure predictability and consistency. However, the history of the
statute of frauds should inform us that where technical, formal rules, even those
designed to reduce litigation, run contrary to expectations and practices in the
community, increased conflict and increased litigation will likely result. 184
As a general proposition, Americans expect people to do what they promise,
even if their words and promises are not printed on a typed document that has
been signed and sealed. 185 Oral agreements are generally enforceable with some
recognized and frequently-litigated exceptions.186 Thus, a return to formality can
frustrate the reasonable expectations of parties and can add to, rather than reduce,
conflict.
C. Requiring a Writing for Mediated Settlement
The issues created by attempts to enforce oral mediation agreements appear
at first blush to be quite similar to the issues raised when parties enter an oral
agreement in a non-mediation setting. The court must focus on the testimony and
conduct of the parties to determine whether an agreement was reached, and if so,
its terms. If the parties present conflicting testimony, there is a difficult proof
problem. This proof problem is not unique to oral agreements in mediations. In
fact, factual disputes in a mediation process might be more easily resolved
because of the presence of the neutral party, who can provide a "neutral"
embrace formal, technical rules because they reduce case loads.
184 In California, savvy parties can avoid the harsh consequences of technical rules by
formalistic ritual. If the parties officially terminate the mediation before dictating the terms
of the agreement, then the subsequent agreement is not bound by the technical rules limiting
its enforceability. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 202-03
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (admitting a transcript of a dictated oral settlement because it was
dictated after the parties terminated the mediation).
185 But see Deason, supra note 10, at 53 ("The impetus for these mediation writing
requirements seems to spring in some states from a concern for protecting unrepresented
parties who may not realize the seriousness of an agreement they reach in mediation.").
186 Many courts continue to enforce oral mediation agreements. See, e.g., Sheng v.
Starkey Labs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Minnesota Law); Orta v.
Con-Way Transp., No. CIV.A.02-1673, 2002 WL 31262063, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2002);
Lampe v. O'Toole, 685 N.E.2d 423,424 (111. App. Ct. 1997); Vo v. Honeywell, No.C3-97-
1393, 1998 WL 15909, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998); Kaiser Found. Health Plan v.
Doe, 903 P.2d 375,383 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc. 876 P.2d
880, 889 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994).
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perspective on what was said. 187 In the typical caucus-based mediation,
communications between the parties are conveyed by the mediator. The mediator
chooses the language. Mediator testimony may be essential to any accurate
assessment of what was said in these private sessions. But of course, opening up
the private mediation caucus to public scrutiny at trial implicates privacy and
confidentiality concerns. Most mediators chafe at the prospect of having to take
the witness stand and recite publicly what was extracted through trust and
confidence at the mediation session.
Enforcing oral settlement agreements in court-connected mediations raises
unique issues. In many bargaining settings, past dealings, trade usage, and part
performance tend to shed light on any contractual relationship created by oral
exchanges. When disputes arise about whether a matter was settled in a court-
connected mediation, the alleged agreements tend to be wholly executory with
little past experience between parties to provide guidance in interpretation.
Certainly, encouraging parties to memorialize their agreement in a writing ought
to be encouraged, but this will not resolve all conflict.
A formal, written contract may assist the court in deciding whether an
agreement was reached and provides an objective basis for applying the terms of
the agreement. However, refusing to enforce fair agreements not memorialized in
a compliant writing does not necessarily effectuate the desires of the parties and
may conflict with mediation's core value of self-determination. Many have noted
that the writing requirement of the statute of frauds promotes more fraud than it
prevents. 188 The statute of frauds did not eliminate litigation relating to oral
agreements. In fact, it spawned hundreds of cases focusing not on the substantive
issue of whether the parties reached an agreement that should be enforced but on
numerous issues about the application of this technical statute.
Imposing technical rules that run contrary to community values or
expectations tends to increase litigation and produce technical decisions by the
courts that create even more litigation and confusion. The experiences in Florida,
Indiana, and Texas are instructive. Pursuant to court rules in these states,
187 See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1999),:
[T]he mediator is positioned in this case to offer what could be crucial, certainly
very probative, evidence about the central factual issues in this matter. There is a strong
possibility that his testimony will greatly improve the court's ability to determine
reliably what the pertinent historical facts actually were. Establishing reliably what the
facts were is critical to doing justice ....
Id; see also Ramirez v. DeCoster, 142 F. Supp. 2d 104, 113 (D. Me. 2001) (crediting the
mediator as "the most neutral and dispassionate observer of what was said and done").
188 See, e.g., Marvin v. Wallis, 119 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038 (K.B. 1856); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 6.1, at 366. But see Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747 (1931) (supporting the statute of
frauds).
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otherwise fair mediation settlement agreements are not enforceable unless they
are in writing and signed by the parties and their lawyers. 189 These rules,
designed to clarify and reduce conflict, are instead implicated in substantial
litigation. In Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 190 the Florida District
Court of Appeals refused to enforce a written settlement agreement obtained
during a mediation that was signed by the attorney in the presence of the party
but was not signed by the party itself. 191 But, in Jordan v. Adventist Health
System/Sunbelt, Inc., 192 a different Florida appellate court enforced a settlement
agreement reached during mediation that was signed by the parties but not by
their attorneys. 193 The court in Jordan warned that "the mediation rules are
developing sufficient complexity and have experienced such frequent
amendment that even those most familiar with them seem to have difficulty
following their requirements." 94
The Indiana courts also have repeatedly been called upon to interpret a
similar rule. In Silkey v. Investors Diversified Service, Inc., a mediator
memorialized an agreement on a tape recording with each party assenting to the
agreement on the tape. 195 The settlement was challenged because there was no
executed writing as required by the Indiana court rule. 196 The court of appeals
enforced the agreement, concluding that the court rule did not supersede the
common law rule that made oral settlement agreements enforceable. 197 Three
years later, the Indiana Supreme Court disapproved of that interpretation in
189 See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b); IND. ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. R. 2.7(E)(2); TEx. R.
Civ. P. 11.
190 Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
191 Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517; see also Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d
517, 518-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to enforce an oral agreement allegedly
entered into during mediation); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 8-9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (refusing to enforce a settlement agreement signed by mediator).
192 Jordan v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt Inc., 656 So. 2d 200, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
193 Id. at 202.
194 Id. at 201 n. 1. This technical privilege rules created additional litigation. See
Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 966 (Fla. 2001) (refusing to automatically
disqualify a trial judge who was improperly informed of confidential mediation information).
195 Silkey v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 690 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997).
196 Id. at 332 (citing IND. ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. R. 2.7(E)(2), which provides that
if an "agreement is reached.., it shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and
their counsel").
197 Silkey, 690 N.E.2d at 332.
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Vernon v. Acton. 198 The court refused to allow testimony about an oral settlement
agreement arrived at during mediation because the court rules precluded oral
settlement in court-connected mediations.' 99
The Indiana Supreme Court expressed its hope that "[r]equiring written
agreements, signed by the parties, is more likely to maintain mediation as a
viable avenue for clear and enduring dispute resolution rather than one leading to
further uncertainty and conflict. '200 However, technical rules tend to breed
uncertainty and more litigation. In Reno v. Haler, the Indiana Court of Appeals
had to revisit this rule to enforce a settlement agreement that was typed but
unsigned. 20 1 The court concluded that the parties complied with the court rule
when they signed the mediator's handwritten notes that conformed to the
unsigned settlement agreement. 20 2 Again, in Spencer v. Spencer, the Indiana
Court of Appeals had to address the issue of whether to enforce an oral mediated
settlement agreement. 20 3 Thus, the technical rules do not eliminate litigation but
shift the focus of it away from the merits and the issues of self-determination or
fairness and on to technical, legalistic issues.
A similar and long-standing rule in Texas has also bred confusion and
repeated litigation over technical issues. Like the rules in Florida and Indiana, the
Texas rule requires that to be enforceable, settlements in pending suits must be
written, signed, and filed, unless made in open court and entered on the
record. 204 Cantu v. Moore is a recent case in the long line of decisions addressing
198 Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 809-10 (Ind. 2000).
199 Id. at 810.
200 Id.
201 Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see also In re Paternity
of K.R.H., 784 N.E.2d 985,989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding mediation rules not applicable
to negotiations referred to by the judge as "informal mediation" without the mediator); Estate
of Skalka v. Skalka, 751 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that because the trial
judge was not acting as a mediator, the special mediation rules were not applicable).
20 2 Reno, 734 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
203 Spencer v. Spencer, 752 N.E.2d 661, 663-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to
enforce a mediated settlement agreement dictated by the mediator in the presence of the
parties).
204 TEx. R. Civ. P. 11. Other states have had similar experiences. See Gelfand v.
Gabriel, No. B 152557, 2002 WL 1397037, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2002) (enforcing a
mediation settlement agreement in California not signed by plaintiff as required by CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 1987 & Supp. 2003)); Murphy v. Padilla, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722,
727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce settlement reached by attorneys); see also
Lavigne v. Green, 23 P.3d 515, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (challenging a settlement not in
writing or put on the record); In re Patterson, 969 P.2d 1106, 1110-11 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999) (litigating the issue in Washington of whether a mediated settlement agreement is
enforceable absent the signature of a party's attorney); Bryant v. Palmer Coking Coal Co.,
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this issue.205 The Texas Court of Appeals ruled that a mediated settlement
agreement, in part dictated to a court reporter outside of court and in part agreed
upon in open court, was enforceable despite non-compliance with the Texas rule.
In 1984, the Texas Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Hyde acknowledged the
extensive litigation addressing this rule and its predecessor that had been in
effect in Texas since 1877.206 The Texas Supreme Court stated its belief that the
rule reflected sound policy and that oral agreements "'are very liable to be
misconstrued or forgotten, and to beget misunderstandings and
controversies." 20 7 The court recognized the essential "thorny" conflict between
the substantive law of contracts which enforced oral agreements and this
procedural rule.208 With a straight face, the court stated "[o]ur holding, that Rule
11 means precisely what it says, should not be interpreted as requiring 'slavish
adherence' to the literal language of the rule in all cases." 20 9 Enough said.
D. Really Technical Rules-Magic Words
Minnesota's statute requires certain "magic words" before a written mediated
settlement agreement will be enforced. 210 Specifically, the statute requires
clauses reciting 1) that the agreement is binding, 2) that the parties were advised
that the mediator had no duty to protect their interest, 3) that signing might
adversely affect their rights, and 4) that the parties understood that they should
consult an attorney if they were uncertain about their rights.211 Rather than
858 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to enforce an agreement not signed or
stipulated to under the Washington rule).
205 Cantu v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d 821, 825 (Tex. App. 2002); see also West Beach
Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeijac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 255-56 (Tex. App. 2002) (enforcing a mediated
settlement signed by attorney but not by a partner); In re Allen, No. 07-96-0195-CV, 1996
WL 686895, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Nov. 27, 1996) (refusing to enforce signed settlement
agreement that was not filed); Kosowska v. Khan, 929 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. App. 1996)
(enforcing a non-complying settlement agreement that was certified by a shorthand reporter).
But see Moseley v. EMCO Mach. Works Co., 890 S.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Tex. App. 1994)
(agreement dictated to court reporter not enforceable where consent was withdrawn).
206 Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex. 1984).
207 Id. at 529 (quoting Birdwell v. Cox, 18 Tex. 535, 537 (Tex. 1857)).
208 Id. at 529.
209 Id.
210 MINN. STAT. § 572.35 (1996); see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123 (Deering 2002);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2003).
211 MINN. STAT. § 572.35 (1996). The current version of this statute may also be
satisfied if the parties were "otherwise advised" of the above-stated risks in a manner other
than being expressly contained within the agreement itself. MINN. STAT. § 572.35 (2003).
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producing certainty, the statute encouraged litigation on technical issues
unrelated to self-determination or fair agreements.
For example, Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Company2 12
generated three separate published opinions by three different courts. Ultimately,
the mediated settlement agreement initialed by the attorneys and signed on each
page by the parties was found to be unenforceable. 2 13 No claim was made that
the agreement was unfairly extracted or was an unfair bargain. Although the
document stated that it was a "Full and Final Mutual Release of All Claims," the
document did not include the "magic words" of the Minnesota statute.2 14 The
document did not say it was "binding." 2 15 Although the federal trial judge2 16
characterized this approach as a "trap for both the unwary and the wary" and
inconsistent with common expectations and practices, the Minnesota Supreme
Court replied that if the statute produced unintended results, it was a problem for
the legislature. 2 17 Of course, it really was a problem for the citizens in Minnesota
who were compelled to go to mediation.
V. COMMENTATORS-FLEXIBLE CONTRACT PRINCIPLES MIXED WITH
BRIGHT-LINE RULES
Commentators struggle with the propriety of judicial enforcement of
agreements reached through the consensual process of mediation, in part because
of the seemingly conflicting values between mediation and the litigation process.
Mediation is valued because it is consensual, private, and collaborative; the trial
system is adversarial and public. Ultimately, the commentators tend to agree that
contract law is the appropriate method of enforcement, with special consideration
given to context, or in some cases, special bright-line rules applied to
accommodate these differing values.
In 1986, Robert P. Bums anticipated these modem enforcement issues in an
essay exploring the relationship between the processes of mediation and
212 Haghighi III, 173 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 1999); Haghighi 1, 945 F. Supp. 1233,
1234-35 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999); Haghighi If, 577 N.W.2d
927 (Minn. 1998) (answering certified question from Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co.,
945 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir 1999)).
213 For an analysis of these cases see Coben & Thompson, supra note 177, at 300-07.
2 14 Haghighi Ill, 173 F.3d at 1088.
215 Haghighi 11, 577 N.W.2d at 929.
216 Haghighi I, 945 F. Supp. at 1234.
217 Haghighi II, 577 N.W.2d at 930. After the Haghighi cases, the Minnesota
legislature amended the statute to allow compliance with proof that somebody (presumably
the mediator) advised the parties about the statutory requirements. See MINN. STAT. § 572.35
(2003) (as amended by 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 190 (West)); see also supra note 210.
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litigation. 218 He concluded that mediated settlement agreements should be
enforced by courts using contract law principles. Bums recognized the concern
that exposing the mediation process to the enforcement powers of the court could
"distort the course of mediation," 219 but argued that contract law was sufficiently
flexible to protect the interests of the mediation process. 220 In any contractual
analysis, the context of the mediation process will be important in assessing
contractual enforceability. Traditional contract law, according to Bums, allows
for consideration of context. 221 Questions of power, exploitation, or agreement
can all be worked out under contract analysis, which is flexible and case
specific.222
Recently, James J. Alfini and Catherine G. McCabe addressed the increased
number of cases where parties sought judicial enforcement of mediation
settlements. 223 They noted the potential conflict between traditional contractual
principles favoring settlement and judicial economy and one of mediation's core
values: self-determination. 224 Alfini and McCabe were also concerned about
unfair practices in mediations, remarking that "allegations of settlement coercion
raise troubling issues relating to mediation's core values of party self-
determination, voluntariness, and mediator impartiality that may not be easily
discerned or correctable through the judicial process." 225 They agreed with Bums
that courts should continue to address the issue of enforceability of mediated
settlement agreements in the context of contract law, but within "a framework
that recognizes mediation's unique character and attributes."226
Other commentators agree that in general, contract principles should be
applied, but by focusing on differing aspects of mediation's "unique character
and attributes," they have urged the use of bright-line rules to preclude judicial
discretion, or even judicial inquiry, into certain issues. Ellen E. Deason, who
placed a high value on confidentiality in the mediation process, conceded that the
interests in privacy and confidentiality must give way to the enforcement of a
written mediated settlement agreement. 227 She viewed the value of applying
218 Robert P. Bums, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An Essay on
Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 93, 93 (1986).
219 Id. at 93.
220 Id. at 105.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 110.
223 Alfini & McCabe, supra note 10, at 172.
224 Id. at 173-74.
225 Id. at 205.
226 Id. at 206.
227 Deason, supra note 10, at 102.
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principles of contract law to enforce valid mediated settlement agreements as
"affirming the effectiveness of mediation as a settlement process and reenforcing
parties' incentives to mediate." 228 However, if the agreement is not reduced to
writing, Deason believed that any enforcement actions would intrude too deeply
into the confidentiality of the mediation.229 Deason would enforce a bright-line
rule precluding any contractual enforcement of oral agreements during a
mediation.230
Nancy A. Welsh also argued that the general framework of contract law
should apply to mediated settlement agreements, but with substantial
modifications to protect mediation's core value of self-determination. 231 She
viewed self-determination broadly as insuring active and direct party
"participation, communication, and negotiation; the parties' identification and
selection of the interests and substantive norms... [and] control over the final
outcome." 232 Welsh noted that "'self-determination' is not part of the lexicon
regarding the enforcement of negotiated settlement agreements.' 233 Because of
the presumption favoring settlements and the limited inquiry into what the parties
actually desired, traditional contract law does not provide adequate protection for
settlements arrived at under a mediation process designed to protect party self-
determination. Muscle-mediators using high pressure tactics may well extract
objective manifestation of assent, but not self-determined agreement.
Welsh suggested a number of modifications to contract law to accommodate
mediation's context and goals. For example, she addressed the possibility of
expanding contract law principles to make it easier for an aggrieved party to
228 Id. at 37.
229 Id. at 102.
230 Id. This, of course, is similar to the approach represented by the Uniform Mediation
Act. Although the Uniform Mediation Act does not address the enforcement of oral
agreements, it precludes evidence about oral agreements, making them difficult, if not
impossible, to prove. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 reporter's note, at 2 (2003) (explaining
why the act provides no privilege exception to allow evidence about an oral settlement
agreement).
231 Welsh, supra note 10, at 87. Professor Welsh cited numerous ethical codes
proclaiming self-determination as a core value of mediation. See FLA. R. FOR CERT. AND
APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10:310; VA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.11 (2000); id. at 3 n.l (citing
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § I (Joint Comm. of Delegates from Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n & Soc'y of Prof'ls in Dispute Resolution (1994)); see
also Levin, supra note 91, at 273-74 (discussing various mediation rules and concluding
that "[n]early all of these mediator rules place considerable emphasis on self-determination
in mediation").
232 Welsh, supra note 10, at 80.
233 Id. at 87.
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establish coercion. 234 Welsh also suggested that the defense of undue influence
could be expanded to address mediator coercion, arguing that the parties
frequently assume that a mediator is in a fiduciary type of relationship with both
parties.235 Professor Welsh recognized that for this defense to work, mediator
codes would have to be amended to create specific duties regulating mediator
conduct. 236 Professor Welsh shared Deason's concern that increased litigation
would impair confidentiality. 237 Ultimately, to protect the interest of self-
determination of the parties in mediations, Welsh suggested that parties should
have a three-day cooling off period or right of rescission. 238 Parties could then
reflect on whether the agreement was in their best interests, free from the
coercive pressures in the mediation.239
VI. IMPOSING RIGID BRIGHT-LINE RULES TO A PROCESS PREMISED ON
SELF-DETERMINATION
It is odd for ADR scholars to advocate bright-line, legalistic rules to remedy
problems created in a process heralded because of its focus on self-
determination. These rules lump people or cases into categories; they do not
allow for individual differences or assessments based on the unique facts or
personal choices made in each case. The litigation world favors bright-line rules
because they limit judicial discretion and, in theory, reduce litigation. Whether
the bright-line rules for ADR will result in more justice than injustice may in part
depend on why and where the lines are drawn. Frequently, the lines are drawn
arbitrarily as a matter of administrative or judicial convenience. Rarely will the
lines be drawn to facilitate self-determination.
Technical rules might be justified in part on a general deterrence theory.
Courts enforce a rule rigidly not because it results in justice in any one case, but
234 Id. at 82-84. However, Welsh warned that if mediator coercion is easily litigated,
few people would want to be mediators. Id. at 83.
235 Id. at 84-86; see supra note 31 and accompanying text
236 Welsh, supra note 10, at 85.
237 Id. at 86.
238 Id.at 87-92.
239 Id. at 88; see also Weller, supra note 10, at 14. Weller suggested that contract
principles may be inadequate when enforcing mediated settlements. Id. According to Weller,
the arms-length bargaining model that serves as the prototype for substantive contract
principles is far from the reality of mediated settlements. Id. at 14-16. Because of the
mediator's real power to influence the agreement in light of the parties' vulnerability, Weller
argued that courts should rescind agreements if there is a disparity in expertise between the
parties, and the disadvantaged party establishes a misunderstanding of the rights or
ramifications of the agreement. Id. at 39.
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because the harsh results produced encourage others to engage in better practices
in the future. For example, one of the justifications for refusing to enforce an
otherwise fair mediated oral settlement agreement is to encourage future
mediation participants to engage in sound practices and reduce their agreements
to writing.240
Certainly, parties should reduce agreements to writing to identify and resolve
any lingering areas of disagreement and to memorialize the moment. Smart
lawyers who frequently represent parties in mediations, perhaps even trained
mediators, might eventually bring their behavior into compliance and execute
enforceable writings.24 1 But where the rules governing mediation settlements are
different from the rules governing other negotiated settlements, it is unlikely that
the general public will understand the distinctions. Unrepresented parties, as well
as parties represented by lawyers unfamiliar with technical mediation rules,
would be at risk of such misunderstanding in mediations, unless of course, a
trained mediator helps them out and provides legal advice.242 Some mediators
might help out and some might not. 243
Imposing technical, specialized rules in mediations .such as a statute of
frauds, that conflict with custom, practice, or reasonable expectations, will create
confusion, uncertainty, and litigation. Dissatisfied parties will litigate such issues
as what types of negotiations qualify as mediation sessions governed by these
rules.244 When do the special mediation rules begin to operate?2 45 When does the
240 See Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind. 2000) ("Requiring written
agreements, signed by the parties, is more likely to maintain mediation as a viable avenue for
clear and enduring dispute resolution rather than one leading to further uncertainty and
conflict.").
241 See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 6 reporter's note, at 2 (2003) (stating that "because the
majority of courts and statutes limit the confidentiality exception to signed written
agreements, one would expect that mediators and others will soon incorporate knowledge of
a writing requirement into their practice").
242 See generally Coben & Thompson, supra note 177, at 316 (arguing that imposing
technical rules in mediations unrelated to the parties' reasonable expectation creates
uncertainty and unfair surprise).
243 Scholars continue to debate the issue of whether a mediator should assume the
responsibility to ensure that the settlement agreements are enforceable. If mediators are not
lawyers, this requirement is problematic. Where do they get the expertise? Are they
practicing law? Are they still neutral? If the mediators are lawyers, the issues are still
complicated. See generally Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 941-42 (expressing a concern that only lawyers could
ethically be mediators if mediators gave opinions about outcomes).
244 See, e.g., Vernon , 732 N.E.2d at 810. (concluding that post-suit ADR privilege
rules were applicable to a pre-suit mediation because of the parties' agreement).
245 See, e.g., Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536, 541
(Del. Ch. 2001) (finding the mediation privilege rule applicable despite claims that the
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mediation end? 246 How do you treat settlements arrived at the week after or
hours after the parties leave the mediation sessions? 247 Typical statute of frauds
issues will be litigated, such as what types of writings qualify? 248 Do
confirmatory memoranda satisfy the writing requirement? 249 What about the
notes of the mediator? 250
Some of these questions can be addressed by careful drafting. For example,
the Uniform Mediation Act, which creates a privilege precluding evidence of
oral agreements in mediation, 251 provides fairly specific definitions of what
processes are governed by the act,252 what types of writings count, 253 and when
the mediation process begins for purposes of confidentiality. 254 The act,
however, does not indicate when a mediation ends. 255 Thus, careful drafting will
not totally avoid litigation. 25 6
parties did not sign an agreement to mediate as required by the statute and that the letters that
comprised the settlement were written outside of the mediation process).
246 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 200, 202 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (admitting an oral agreement because the parties "concluded their mediation
session, and then created a transcript of the settlement").
247 See, e.g., In re Bidwell, 21 P.3d 161, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that settlement
letters were connected to the pending mediation and therefore privileged).
248 See, e.g., Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing an
agreement dictated by the mediator and affirmed by the parties on tape), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1117 (1997); Tranakos v. Miller, 470 S.E.2d 440,444 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that
transcripts of a taped telephone conversation qualified as a writing).
249 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2003) (allowing a confirmatory response to satisfy the
statute of frauds if the agreement is between merchants).
250 See, e.g., Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that
signed notes of the mediator qualified as a writing).
251 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACr § 4 (2003) (creating a privilege for mediation
communications with exceptions).
252 See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 2(1) (2003) (defining mediation as "a process in which
a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute"); see also id. § 2 reporter's note, at
1.
253 Id. § 2(8) (defining a record as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form"); see
also id. § 3 (delineating when the Uniform Mediation Act is applicable)
254 Id. § 2(2) (defining the mediation communications subject to protection by privilege
as statements during a mediation or made for purposes of "considering, conducting,
participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator").
255 Id. § 2(2) reporter' s note, at 2 (stating that this issue was left to the "sound judgment
of the courts" to reduce complexity in the text of the statute).
256 Id. § 6 reporter's note, at 2 (attempts to provide guidance and supply answers to
issues not explicitly resolved in the text of the statute).
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Conflicting policy choices, as well as ambiguous or incomplete text, will
serve as grist for the mill of the litigation process. Professor Deason, of course, is
correct that litigating disputes about oral agreements may require courts to delve
deeply into the privacy of the mediation setting.257 However, enforcing written
agreements frequently requires inquiry into the context and communications
leading up to the writing in order to effectuate the self-determined agreement of
the parties.258 The text of the Uniform Mediation Act, influenced by mediators,
chooses to protect the long-term privacy interests of the mediator, even at the risk
of undermining the recognized goals of self-determination and fair treatment of
the parties in the individual mediation. 259 This conflict in values will continue to
serve as impetus for parties to seek relief from the courts when technical
obstacles or bright-line rules preclude them from enforcing reasonable
agreements entered into fairly or from defending against alleged agreements
obtained through unfair means.
The bright-line advanced by Professor Welsh is specifically designed to
protect self-determination. 260 Some states currently adopt a cooling off period
similar to the one proposed.261 This bright line would be helpful to some
In other words, a participant's notes about an oral agreement would not be a
signed agreement. On the other hand, the following situations would be considered a
signed agreement: a handwritten agreement that the parties have signed, an e-mail
exchange between the parties in which they agree to particular provisions, and a tape
recording in which they state what constitutes their agreement.
Id.
257 See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Coulter v. Carewell Corp., 21 P.3d 1078, 1078-84 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)
(accepting a mediator affidavit where a written mediated settlement agreement was not the
complete agreement); Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d 196, 196-97 (Tex. App. 1995) (ruling
that the issue of whether the parties intended to be bound by writings was a fact issue); see
also Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Reseland, 619 N.W.2d 230, 233-36 (Neb. 2000)
(enforcing a written mediated settlement agreement). But see Golding v. Floyd, 539 S.E.2d
735, 738 (Va. 2001) (refusing to accept parole evidence because the written mediated
settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous).
259 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(c) (2003) (providing that if a party claims that an
executed settlement agreement was reached through fraud or duress, the mediator retains a
privilege not to provide evidence). See Hughes, supra note 87, at 23.
260 See supra note 231-39 and accompanying text.
261 See CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.82(c) (West 2003) (providing a three day cooling off
period for unrepresented parties in earthquake insurance mediations) see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.7015(6) (West 2003) (allowing an insured in a property insurance mediation
three days to rescind a mediated settlement agreement); MINN. STAT. § 572.35(2) (2002)
(providing a 72-hour cooling off period in debtor/creditor mediations); MINN. STAT. ANN.
SPECIAL R. OF PRAC. FOR FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST. 2.7 (West 2002) (providing a 72-hour right
of rescission of a mediation agreement in conciliation court).
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mediation parties who are pressured by the mediator, the adverse party, or by
their attorney to sign an agreement before leaving the mediation.262 However, the
cooling off period will assist parties only if they become free from the pressure
and are able to recognize immediately that their true interests were not
accommodated in the mediation settlement. The harangued party may be free
from the immediate physical threat or coercion, but the impact of "threats," or
exaggerated representations that influenced them to sign the agreement, may
linger beyond a few days after the mediation. Further, if the language of the
agreement is supplied by the mediator or is otherwise not clearly owned by the
parties, the parties may not realize the inadequacy or ambiguity of the agreement
until weeks or months later when it is time to comply with the agreement.
The cooling off period has the advantage of simplicity. It requires no
explanation or showing that the agreement is unfair, only that the party does not
want to agree any more. The proposed right of rescission represents a procedural
compromise between the interests of finality and self-determination. As with all
compromises, however, it does not fully protect either of these interests. No
matter where the line is drawn, one day, three days, or one week, there will be
situations raising serious concerns about unfair treatment in the mediation
process. In cases like Randle v. Mid-Gulf Inc., where the party claimed he signed
the agreement because the mediator would not let him leave despite chest pains,
this cooling off period would protect the value of self-determination. 263 On the
other hand, the escape clause would also benefit those like Ms. Olam, who
according to the magistrate's version of the facts, would delay, agree, retract the
agreement, and take advantage of every opportunity to postpone the need to
address her responsibility to repay the money she borrowed. 264 Ms. Olam could
again retract the agreement, further postponing resolution.265
262 See Welsh, supra note 10, at 91-92 (arguing that the right to rescind would also
serve as a disincentive for the mediator or others to engage in coercive tactics).
26 3 Randle v. Mid-Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292 CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *2 (Tex. App.
Aug. 8, 1996).
264 Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Ms.
Olam signed a loan agreement that she later claimed she never read. Id. at 1113. She signed a
workout agreement in 1993 that she later claimed she signed under duress. Id. at 1114. She
signed a second work out agreement in 1994 after foreclosure notices. Id. She again claimed
duress and that she was incapable of understanding the agreement. When faced with
foreclosure, Ms. Olam filed suit. Id. at 1114-15. In 1997, she agreed to mediate in exchange
for a continuance, but canceled the mediation session on the day before it was scheduled.
Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-16. Three weeks before the trial date, in August 1998 she
again agreed to mediate. Id. at 1116. During mediation she signed a memorandum of
understanding. Id. at 1117. After the mediator and her counsel reported to the court that the
matter was settled, Ms. Olam called the court trying to retract her agreement. Id. Throughout
the various proceedings, Ms. Olam was associated with counsel who Ms. Olam insisted were
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In the seven state supreme court cases discussed previously,266 in only one of
the cases did a party make an immediate complaint about the mediation
agreement, and this was after the court had dismissed the case. 267 If there was a
three-day right of rescission, it is possible that the aggrieved parties in the other
cases might have rescinded, but this is hard to predict. It is also possible that a
three day cooling off period could have the practical effect of a three day statute
of limitations, sort of a "speak now or forever hold your peace" rule. The cooling
off period may in some cases assist in ensuring self-determination, but it cannot
provide assurance that the parties' interest in fair procedures or self-
determination is protected in mediations.
VII. THE TENSION BETWEEN CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND MEDIATION'S
GOALS
A. The Context of Mediation Is Different from Private Negotiation
The prototype contract negotiation contemplates an arms-length process,
where each party is assumed to act in its best interests to maximize its
position.268 Parties in arms-length negotiations should assume that the other party
is self-interested as well. Trust no one, challenge everything. The parties should
also expect that any agreement reached will create rights enforceable in the
neither actually representing her or looking out for her best interests. Id. at 1117-19. As of
1999, the mortgage company was still trying to enforce her obligation to pay back the money
she borrowed. Id. at 1119.
265 Professor Welsh suggested a possible exception to the right of rescission for
agreements reached on the eve of trial. Welsh, supra note 10, at 90. This exception could
negate the effect of the rule, however, because of the many court annexed mediations that
take place near the trial date.
266 See supra note 9.
267 See Snyder-Falkingham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36, 38 (Va. 1995). After
mediation and subsequent negotiations the parties reached agreement the night before trial.
Id. at 38. The next day, the plaintiff's lawyer went to court and moved on behalf of plaintiff
to dismiss the case with prejudice. Id. It was later that day that plaintiff indicated that she did
not want to be bound. Id.; see also Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Roseland, 619 N.W.2d 230,
233 (Neb. 2000). In Roseland, the defendant indicated it did not want to be bound after the
parties had reported at a pre-trial conference that settlement had been reached. Roseland, 619
N.W.2d at 233. The opinion is not clear when defendant first indicated it did not want to be
bound. Defendant sent a letter indicating it would not execute the settlement papers two
weeks after the pre-trial conference. Id.
268 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 52, § 1.2 ("In a market economy, the terms of such
bilateral exchanges are arrived at voluntarily by the parties themselves through this process
of bargaining. Each party to an exchange seeks to maximize its own economic advantage on
terms tolerable to the other party.").
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courts. Consequently, parties are on notice that they should be careful about the
language they exchange and should use definite terms of promise only if they
intend to be bound. The precise language used is the key to determining whether
there is mutual assent and the key to determining the extent of the obligations
and rights. The parties supply the language of agreement. The courts assume that
the parties, operating in their own self-interest, would not select words of
agreement if they did not intend to be bound. 269
The core values in mediation are party empowerment and self-determination.
While the focus under contract law is on what the parties said, the focus in a
mediation should be on what the parties want. The goal is to empower the
parties. Empowered parties will control their fate and reach a voluntary
agreement tailored to their specific needs. The imposition of formal rules of
contract enforcement and defenses may frustrate the parties from reaching the
result they wanted. The context of a mediated agreement and a privately
negotiated agreement are very different.270
Treating mediated settlements and adversarial negotiated settlements as if
they were identical processes may be inappropriate. According to one
commentator:
The goals of mediation are quite different than the goals of the litigation
system. Mediation involves a radically distinct and contrasting paradigm--one
that embraces a mindset, visions, skill set, and attitudes different from those of
the prevailing adversarial norm .... Consequently, the rules, and the conduct
to be governed by those rules, must be changed .... 271
Even highly evaluative mediations may look and feel much different from
the typical bilateral negotiation. 272 Participants in mediations are encouraged to
trust the neutral, the process, and that all the participants in the mediation will act
cooperatively to reach agreement. The parties are encouraged to be unguarded in
communication and to work with the mediator and the other party to find
common ground for agreement. To the extent the courts provide guidance or
rules about how mediations are to be conducted, the rules focus on methods of
encouraging candor.273 Thus, rather than a guarded, adversarial process where
269 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., Alfini & McCabe, supra note 10, at 205 ("[T]he general policy favoring
settlement, while advancing the goal ofjudicial economy, may not always be consistent with
mediation principles and values.").
271 Kovach, New Wineskins, supra note 152, at 942-43.
272 See Welsh, supra note 10, at 64-78 (addressing the courts' high tolerance for
pressure tactics in judicial settlement conference).
273 See, e.g., UNWF. MEDIATION ACT § 1 prefatory note (2003), stating:
[Vol. 19:2 2004]
ENFORCING RIGHTS
the participants focus on maximizing self-interest and choosing words carefully,
the mediation process encourages free exchange of ideas, sharing, creative
thinking, collaboration, and brainstorming.
Because of the heightened expectations of candor and cooperation, parties
may be less guarded and more susceptible to relying on representations coming
from the adverse party. In the typical caucus-style mediation, statements of fact
or representations are filtered through the court-sanctioned, neutral mediator,
which gives the representations added significance and integrity in the eyes of
the party. The compressed time frame and physical proximity of the participants
also may contribute to an enhanced possibility of intimidation, coercion, or
duress. Bilateral negotiation and court-ordered mediation present substantially
different contexts, which affect the parties' expectations and behavior in
different ways.
B. The Mediator as Neutral Facilitator or Advocate for Settlement
The most significant difference in a mediation context is the unique role the
mediator plays in influencing the agreement. Although both bilateral negotiations
and mediations involve negotiation, the neutral's role in mediation dramatically
changes the dynamics, expectations, and motivation of the parties. The mediator
is not a stranger observing a debate, but can, and frequently does, take on a
dominant role in the bargaining process. According to one commentator, "a
skillful but biased mediator can have a substantial influence on the parties'
settlement. ' 274 A skillful and unbiased mediator can also have a substantial
influence on the parties' settlement.
Mediators are certainly skillful. Organizations throughout the country
sponsor wonderful training programs, teaching neutrals how to facilitate,
persuade, or influence parties into believing that a "self-determined" settlement
of their dispute is in their best interests. Bias among mediators in the traditional
sense is not a significant problem in court-connected mediations. 275 Rarely will
Candor during mediation is encouraged by maintaining the parties' and mediators'
expectations regarding confidentiality of mediation communications.... The Drafters
recognize that mediators typically promote a candid and informal exchange regarding
events in the past, as well as the parties' perception(s) of and attitudes toward these
events, and that mediators encourage parties to think constructively and creatively
about ways in which their differences might be resolved.
Id.
274 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1092 (2000).
275 See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 9 (2003) (discussing a mediator's disclosures
concerning conflicts of interest). The appearance of bias or conflicts of interest may be a
more significant problem as experienced mediators or mediators in smaller communities may
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parties experience a mediator appointed by the court who is biased in the
traditional sense of favoring one party over the other, or having some financial or
personal interest in one side prevailing. 276 But while most mediators are
unbiased, most are not disinterested parties.
There are purely facilitative, or maybe even transformative, mediators who
view their role as enhancing communication or strengthening relationships. Most
mediators in court mediations, however, are striving to get a settlement. 277 In
court-connected mediation, the "goal of mediation.., is to resolve the dispute
and agree on a settlement. ' 278 Mediators are trained at "Getting to Yes"' 2 7 9 and
are picked to be mediators because of their skill at extracting agreements. 280 A
successful mediation is one that results in an agreement. 28 1
have had a past relationship with the parties involved. The Uniform Mediation Act and most
professional codes include duties to disclose potential conflicts of interest. See Lehrer v.
Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. App. 2000) (addressing a claim that the mediator
failed to disclose a relationship with counsel).
276 In business or institutional settings, parties may confront mediators or
ombudspersons with employment or financial ties to one of the parties.
277 See Riskin, Understanding Mediator's Orientations, Strategies, and Tactics: A Grid
for the Perplexed, supra note 22, at 23-25; James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the
Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 485 (1996) (observing that
"court-annexed and lawyer controlled mediations tend to be highly evaluative"); see also In
re Patterson, 969 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (enforcing settlement where in the
effort to obtain settlement the mediator told the parties that a lack of settlement would ruin
the mediator's record).
278 Deason, supra note 10, at 37.
279 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (providing strategy and
structure for principled negotiating to resolve successfully all types of disputes).
280 See Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, 82
JUDICATURE 224, 224 (1999) (reporting that attorneys wanted mediators to actively
intervene); Thomas B. Metzloff et al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and
Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 144 (1997) (reporting that most medical
malpractice lawyers surveyed "want mediators to perform an evaluative function"). See
generally McAdoo, supra note 129, at 445 (reporting that "[t]he top factors motivating the
choice of mediation [by Minnesota lawyers] are very settlement oriented- saving expenses,
obtaining settlement, and providing a reality check on client and adverse party"); McAdoo &
Welsh, supra note 7, at 388-89 (concluding that lawyers choose mediation and mediators to
get their cases settled).
281 See Feldman v. Kritch, 824 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(characterizing a mediation that did not result in settlement as a "failed mediation"); Riner v.
Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 804 (W.Va. 2002) (characterizing a mediation as unsuccessful
because it did not result in settlement).
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At the April 2002 American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution
in Seattle, Washington, a featured speaker at a plenary session was Dr. Robert B.
Cialdini, Ph.D., author of Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.282 He
instructed the mediators how to use the "science" of influence to improve the art
of persuasion. Mediators are trained and encouraged to use subtle tactics to move
the recalcitrant parties toward agreement, to "influence" 283 the parties, or, as
some characterize it, to help or facilitate the parties in understanding that
settlement is in their best interests. 284 In the common practice of caucus-based
mediation, the mediator controls the flow of information and the emotional tone.
If a party actually confides in the mediator by disclosing secrets or exposing their
bottom line, the mediator will decide which tactics will make best use of this
information to obtain the agreement. 285 These tactics might be used to influence
the adverse party, or may in a sense, be used against the party making the
disclosure.
In court-connected mediations, mediators come into the process as neutrals
"blessed" by the court. They are trained to use various strategies to obtain the
trust of the parties and typically spend time at the beginning of the mediation
trying to build that trust in part through promises of neutrality and
confidentiality, as well as practiced listening skills. Skilled mediators do in fact
develop a trust relationship with the parties and biased or not, can have, and do
have, a significant impact on whether a settlement is reached and on the terms of
that settlement.
282 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993). For
further information about the conference, see See You in Seattle, April 4-6, 2002: The
Fourth Annual ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Spring Conference, available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/seeyouinseattle.doc (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
283 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS, PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 327-33 (2d ed. 1996) (describing 12 ways that
mediators "influence parties" toward a settlement).
284 Alfini, supra note 17, at 66-74 (categorizing mediator styles as "trashers"-
mediators who evaluate and focus on weaknesses in a party's case to convince them to settle,
"bashers"-mediators who try to get parties to make an offer and then work on the parties to
reach a middle ground, and "hashers"-mediators who try to work things out more as a
facilitator using flexible techniques); see also Riskin, Understanding Mediator's
Orientations, Strategies, and Tactics: A Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 22, at 37
(discussing techniques used by specific mediators to encourage settlement).
285 See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 806 (1999) ("The
mediator's control over the information flow increases when she meets privately with parties
in a caucus. The mediator decides what information to solicit in a caucus and then how much
of that information to reveal to the opposing party.").
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Mediators maintain a type of neutrality at the beginning of a mediation by
not favoring either party. However, as the mediation progresses, mediators will
use their persuasive skills and training to try to facilitate or influence the parties
to agree. Obtaining agreement may require adopting tactics to get a recalcitrant
party to move closer to agreement. Although not biased in a traditional sense,
these mediators possess a strong bias toward settlement that motivates them to
focus their skills and attention on the party who, in the mediator's view, is
holding out for settlement.286
This bias toward settlement might be reflected in direct, highly evaluative
statements of opinion, or even by dire predictions. Depending on the mediator's
style, the bias might also be reflected by the subtle refraining of issues,287 or
delicate, but persistent questioning about the implications of not settling, all
designed to move a recalcitrant party toward a "better" understanding of the
value of settlement.288 Gentle questioning may be more effective than blunt
badgering, but both are designed to facilitate or exact settlement. As one
commentator put it, when faced with parties who are too confident about the
strength of their case:
A skilled mediator can dampen that overconfidence by exposing the parties to
the reactions of disinterested parties apprised of the essential facts of the case.
Whether this is done primarily by asking questions or by making statements
286 See Metzloff et al., supra note 280, at 123 (finding that in medical malpractice
mediations, the "mediator function of 'educating a party' was usually directed at plaintiffs,
perhaps because the mediator believed the defense counsel and insurer had already
realistically informed the physicians of the likely outcomes").
287 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 285, at 805 ("Whenever a mediator assists parties by
identifying and reframing the issues in a dispute, she may influence the result of the
mediation and the authenticity of the parties self-determination.").
288 See MOORE, supra note 283, stating:
By raising questions about potential outcomes that the party may not like, the
mediator can often moderate a party's position and influence him or her toward
mutually acceptable settlement possibilities. For example a mediator might ask
* Do you think you can win in court?
" How certain are you? Ninety percent?
* Seventy-five percent? Fifty percent?
* What risks are you willing to take?
" What if you lose?
* What will your life be like then?
Id.
560
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seems less a matter of ethics than style. In many mediation contexts,
questioning is little more than evaluation by Socratic dialogue. 289
Effective mediators are highly motivated to obtain an agreement. This zeal to
reach settlement can result in over-aggressive neutrals using subtle, as well as not
so subtle pressure to extract a settlement. Mediation sessions can run into the
evening, long past the time when courtrooms are closed. Wearing down parties is
an effective technique to move parties toward settlement. Blunt evaluation,
sophisticated facilitation, and other tactics aimed at influencing parties to settle
may be the reality. The President of the Houston chapter of the Association of
Attorney Mediators was quoted as saying "what some people might consider a
little bullying is really just part of how mediation works. '290 Although the Texas
federal district court repudiated the statement as not accurately representing the
role of mediators, it is likely that some, and maybe many, mediators do more than
facilitate communication. 29 1 The courts' public description of the process may
not reflect the actual practice in these private mediations.
A mediator need not be overtly coercive to influence the settlement. One
technique of a skilled mediator is to focus on areas of agreement and downplay
areas of disagreement. A mediator may even convince two parties who are
disagreeing in different rooms that they are essentially in agreement. The
mediator's focus on settlement may even cloud the mediator's assessment of
whether the parties in fact are agreeing on all material elements. In numerous
cases, the mediator has reported to the court that the parties have in fact reached
agreement when one of the parties later claims no agreement was reached.292 It is
289 Stark, supra note 92, at 788.
290 Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
291 Id. at 948 n.5.
292 See, e.g., Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc. 117 F.3d 1081, 1082 (8th Cir. 1997)
(addressing claims that no agreement was reached after mediator reported to the court that
the parties had reached agreement); Silkey v. Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., 690 N.E.2d
329, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (enforcing an agreement where the mediator reported
agreement was reached but a party later contested that conclusion); Chappell v. Roth, 548
S.E.2d 499,500-01 (N.C. 2001), reh'g denied, 553 S.E.2d 499 (finding no agreement when
the mediator "reported to the trial court that plaintiff and defendants had reached 'agreement
on all issues"'); Few v. Hammock Enters., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 667 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(addressing defendant's claim of no agreement despite the mediator's report that agreement
was reached); Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 803 (W. Va. 2002) (refusing to enforce
a settlement agreement drafted and signed by the mediator); see generally Vance v. Thomas,
829 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (addressing attorney's claim for attorneys'
fees for a mediated settlement agreement when the client maintained there was no
agreement). But see Gordon v. Royal Carribean Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515,516 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to enforce an alleged agreement where the mediator reported
impasse).
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possible that in some of these cases the mediator's assessment is accurate and a
party has changed its mind. It is also possible that in the mediator's rush to
settlement, the mediator failed to appreciate the full extent of disagreement.
The role of the mediator changes the dynamics of settlement discussions.
The mediator's subtle use of trust, technique, and language may provide the
appearance of agreement when parties in fact have not agreed. Applying rules of
enforcement that contemplate arms-length bargaining and focus on the specific
language chosen by the parties may not be appropriate in circumstances where
the language of the mediated agreement is supplied by a mediator293 who may
have overestimated the extent of agreement.
C. Applying Contract Law Within the Context of Mediation
Perhaps Robert P. Burns had it right. 294 If the conciliatory mediation process
creates, rather than resolves, conflict and parties come to court to enforce
settlement agreements, flexible principles of contract law should be applied.
295
Where the court compels parties to participate in a process endorsed by the state,
the courts should at least be open to address issues relating to the fairness of this
state-sponsored process. Privatizing the justice system by referrals to unelected
neutrals requires some supervision. Bright-line rules should not foreclose access
to the courtroom when parties raise concerns about the fairness of the process the
court forced upon them.
As Burns argued, contract law is flexible and takes context into
consideration. 296 In applying traditional principles of contract formation and
defenses, courts should, and do to some extent, take into account the context of
mediated agreements. The context of settlements reached during a mediation is
dramatically different from the context of privately negotiated settlements. While
traditional contract principles may look to whether the parties said they agreed,
mediation theory would focus on whether parties voluntarily wanted to agree.
The mediation context should make courts extremely cautious about finding that
ambiguous language, whether written or oral, creates legal rights. The courts'
293 See generally Weller, supra note 10, at 15, stating:
Often the mediator even controls the language of the final settlement agreement
between the parties. This power stems from the fact that the parties are before the
mediator precisely, because they were unable to find a common language with which to
negotiate. They are thus led to adopt the language of the mediator.
Id. (citing Susan S. Sibley & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAw & POL' Y
7, 26 (1986)).
294 See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
295 Id.
296 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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focus on settlement and finality must be tempered. The West Virginia Supreme
Court addressed this issue in refusing to enforce an alleged mediation settlement
agreement stating, "[w]e do recognize that the mediation process will only work
while the parties are ensured that the process is fair to both sides and where the
attainment of settlement is viewed as non-compulsory. '297
The traditional defenses of duress, misrepresentation, undue influence, and
mistake were developed in the context of bilateral, adversarial negotiations. In
this context, the courts' interest was to police the private bargaining process only
where it yielded unreasonable results because of unfair tactics of an adversary.298
If the result was within the range of acceptable results, the courts were not
interested in correcting the bargaining conduct of the parties. Settlements in court
mediations, however, raise different concerns and expectations. The concept of
self-determination that is central to the mediation culture suggests that a fair
result is one in which the parties voluntarily agree is in their best interests,
without regard to what lawyers or judges might predict they would receive if they
went to court.299 Absent a voluntary and self-determined agreement, the
settlement in mediation cannot be fair even if it is consistent with what lawyers
predict would result in court.
In adversarial negotiations, parties should be on their guard. Good advice
would be to speak cautiously and verify everything. A court will provide no relief
to a party who relies unreasonably on the adverse party's statements, or who
yields too quickly to the adversarial threats. If an adversary asserts pressure, the
reasonable party is not suppose to be accommodating and capitulate, but should
stand tall and fight back. In that sense it may never be reasonable for a party in
court-connected mediation to rely on a representation by the adverse party or the
neutral. Rarely will it be reasonable to give in to coercion or pressure. All
representations in court-connected mediations could be verified in the discovery
process, and most wrongful threats could be addressed head on in subsequent
litigation. However, the context of mediation suggests a more flexible approach
to these common law defenses.
In a different context, courts applying contract reliance principles have made
similar adjustments in substantive law principles. For example, in the famous
California case, Drennan v. Star Paving Co., the court adjusted contract
principles to assure fairness in pre-agreement reliance cases. 300 A general
297 Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 810.
298 Successful contractual defenses are nearly non-existent if the complaining party was
represented by counsel.
299 See Love, supra note 18, at 739-41.
300 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757,761 (Cal. 1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981) (codifying the Drennan holding); see generally
FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 3.26 (discussing the development of pre-contractual
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contractor submitted and won a contract bid relying in part on the bid of a
subcontractor. 301 The subcontractor later tried to withdraw its bid. The
subcontractor argued that based on traditional contract law, offers are revocable
until accepted, and there was no acceptance. 302 The court found that the
subcontractor could not revoke its offer notwithstanding traditional rules of offer
and acceptance. 303 In the context of these arrangements, the court found that the
subcontractor submitted a bid expecting and desiring that the general contractor
would rely on the bid.3°4 The general contractor did rely on the bid to its
detriment. 30 5 The court concluded that principles of justice require that the
subcontractor not be allowed to retract its bid.30 6
In the mediation context, if a party relies on false, material representations
that are made for the purpose of influencing the party to settle, justice would
require at the very least that the settlement be set aside, even though it might
have been possible for the party to recess the mediation and verify the facts
through compulsory discovery. When a party accedes to unfair pressure imposed
by the mediators or the adverse party, the agreement should not be enforced even
if the agreement is within the range of possible results at trial. Flexible principles
of contract law need to adjust to the reality of the pressure and expectations
created in the mediation process.
In particular, courts must account for the ubiquitous role of the mediator
when claims of unfairness in the mediation process are raised. The conflicting
roles of private, court-sanctioned mediators who are neutral, yet zealous
advocates for settlement and serve as both confidants and communicators to the
adverse party, can implicate significant concerns about the fairness of the
process. Resolving these issues is difficult in the context of the prevailing
sentiment toward confidentiality and privilege in mediation.
D. Using Mediation Secrecy Rules to Preclude Supervision of the
Mediation Process
The mediation community has had great success in convincing courts and
legislatures that privacy and secrecy are essential to the effectiveness of ADR
liability).
301 Drennan, 333 P.2d at 758.
302 Id. at 759.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306Ml. at 759.
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processes. 307 Much of the ADR community values mediator privacy because it
empowers mediators, and empowered mediators can use that power, in turn, to
empower the parties to reach a voluntary agreement. 308 The predominant
justification from the ADR community for mediator privacy rules stems from a
facilitative model of mediation, where neutrals assist parties in assessing interests
and in communicating with the other party.309 For this process to be successful,
parties must be free to engage in a frank exchange of ideas.3 10 The parties must
be assured that their candid concessions will not be used against them. Of course,
empowered mediators can also use that power to force or exact settlement,
overcoming a party's resistance to settlement.
The reality in court-connected mediation strays considerably from the
facilitative model. While mediators may begin the process using facilitative
language to encourage the parties to speak candidly, frequently the mediators
will shift tactics. 311 Court-connected mediators settle cases. They evaluate,
influence, and encourage parties to settle. The typical caucus-style mediator is
the communicator, not the facilitator. In most court-connected mediations, the
mediator does not encourage communication, but rather carefully limits
communication between the parties. The mediator puts the parties in separate
rooms so that they cannot speak to each other. The mediator becomes the focal
point of the communication, choosing what to say and what language to use in
speaking with the isolated parties. If the dispute escalates into litigation relating
to the mediation, stringent privilege rules will frustrate resolution consistent with
307 The main focus of the tremendous effort to produce the Uniform Mediation Act was
centered on confidentiality and privacy. See Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled
Advocacy in the Development of the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. Ill. L. Rev. 265, 270
(2002) ("The UMA primarily provides for the privileged nature of mediation
communications. While the Act does address other issues.., the vast majority of the UMA
addresses the issue of privilege and confidentiality.").
308 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (2003):
[M]ediators typically promote a candid and informal exchange . . .and encourage
parties to think constructively and creatively about ways in which their differences
might be resolved. This frank exchange can be achieved only if the participants know
that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their detriment through later court
proceedings and other adjudicatory processes.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See Imperati, supra note 25, at 741 (reporting that most parties expect a mediator to
use a combination of facilitative and evaluative techniques); Levin, supra note 91, at 269
("In practice, however, many mediators combine aspects of facilitative and evaluative
mediation ...."); McAdoo, supra note 129, at 446 (stating that "[o]ver two thirds of the
lawyers surveyed reported a mix of facilitative and evaluative tactics being utilized by
mediators").
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the parties' self-determination. To understand both the context and what was
communicated, the courts frequently must focus on what the mediator said,
whether the agreement is oral or written. 312
Judges also value mediator privacy but usually for a different reason.
Empowered mediators can use that power to exact settlement.313 Bright-line rules
of privilege limit access to courts, thus reducing the court's docket. Therefore,
cloaking the mediation in a blanket of secrecy is an effective tool for getting rid
of cases. Courts do not want to upset the magical process that makes cases
disappear. Bright-line rules are expedient. The court in Willis v. McGraw3 14
stated this principle succinctly. 315 In order to protect the effectiveness of
mediation as a tool to extract settlements as a means to save judicial resources,
the court adopted a bright-line rule to assure the "salutary purposes of [court
ordered ADR] are achieved. '316 The court proclaimed that it will "not involve
itself under any circumstances in sorting out disagreements amongst the parties
from the mediation process." 317
The bright-line secrecy rules are clear and efficient but conjure up the image
of a WWE "no holds barred" cage match. When the victor emerges, no questions
will be asked.318 While privacy is absolutely important to effective mediation
312 There are many cases where a written agreement is complete, fair on its face, and the
moving party can make no showing justifying considering evidence outside of the four
comers of the settlement. But see Gelfand v. Gabriel, No. B 152557, 2002 WL 1397037, at
*3 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. June 27, 2002) (considering statements from the mediator on
the issue of whether a party voluntarily agreed to the settlement he signed); Griffin v.
Wallace, 581 S.E.2d 375, 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (considering representation made to the
parties by the mediator to determine whether an offer was outstanding when it was
purportedly accepted).
313 See, e.g., Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930
(2d Cir. 1979) ("The guarantee of confidentiality permits and encourages counsel to discuss
matters in an uninhibited fashion leading to settlement, the simplification of the issues and
[the resolution of] any other matters.") (citing CIVIL APP. MANAGEMENT PLAN R. 5(a)); see
also Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current Status and the Future
ofADR: A View From the Courts, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 11, 29 (remarking that policy makers
value confidentiality so that mediators are "likely to generate settlements").
314 Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632, 632 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
3 15 Id. at 632.
3 16 Id. at 633. According to the court, breaching the secrecy of a court-conducted
mediation process "would surely destroy the effectiveness of a program which has led to
settlements and withdrawals of some appeals and to the simplification of issues in other
appeals, thereby expediting cases at a time when the judicial resources of this Court are
sorely taxed." Id.
317 Id.
318 See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Bramalea, California, Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126
(Cal. 2001) (recognizing that the mediation privilege statute would allow the party accused
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processes, absolute secrecy does not ensure fair treatment.319 Few Americans
outside of the United States Defense Department believe that secrecy will ensure
that proceedings are fair. Drawing bright lines to protect mediator secrecy
reduces the number of litigated cases but may ignore concerns about fair process,
fair bargains, and self-determination of the parties.
VIM. REGULATING THE PROCESS
Thousands of cases are successfully resolved annually in the United States
by principled, talented mediators who insure the integrity and fairness of their
processes. The recent rash of unhappy mediation participants in the appellate
opinions may be isolated cases. Assuming that access to the courts is not
arbitrarily cut off by bright-line rules, perhaps the litigation process can
adequately address the claims of unfairness in individual cases. Accommodating
the unique context of mediation, courts can apply flexible principles of contract
law to address isolated issues of fairness in the individual case.
On the other hand, the increased appellate litigation by disgruntled mediation
participants may reveal a pervasive problem reflecting on fairness in court-
connected mediation processes. Neither contract law, nor bright-line rules, will
address this process problem.320 In fact, the bright-line rules will shelter and
perpetuate unfair mediation practices. To assure a fair process, the courts need to
supervise more carefully the behaviors of both the participants and the mediator.
To a large extent, the mediation community has been opposed to specifically
delineating the shape of the mediation and the precise role of the mediator in
of the misconduct to assert the privilege precluding proof of misconduct); Eisendrath v.
Super. Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the privilege rules
vest in the adverse party the power to refuse to allow testimony about mediation
communications that could prove that there was a mistake in drafting the mediation
agreement that was not discovered by an unrepresented party until after it was signed).
319 See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality,76 IND. L.J. 591, 594 (2001) (stating that "[b]ecause ADR processes are
cloaked with confidentiality privileges conducted by private third-party neutrals who are
unaccountable to the public or judicial system and not bound to follow or apply the
law,. . . the concern, or at least perception that participants may abuse the ADR process
comes to the forefront").
320 See Phyllis E. Bernard, Only Nixon Could Go to China: Third Thoughts on the
Uniform Mediation Act, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 113, 119 (2001) (arguing that insuring that the
processes used in mediations are fair is more important than focusing on how to fix unfair
agreements after they occur). But see John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to
Promote Good Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 69, 137 (2002) (arguing that existing contract defenses can provide adequate relief for
parties claiming misrepresentation).
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order to encourage self-determination of the parties, flexibility, and creativity.
The parties should be free to set their own rules to address their own problems.
However, as a practical matter, individual mediators, not the parties, tend to set
the ground rules and practices of the mediation. In theory, the ground rules can
be negotiated by the parties. Frequently, however, the rules are embodied in a
form contract to mediate that is crafted by the mediator and may be crafted to
serve the mediator's interests as much as the interests of the parties. The Uniform
Mediation Act hardly addresses procedural fairness in the mediation process
itself. It focuses instead on privilege and confidentiality rules. The Uniform
Mediation Act alludes to principles of self-determination, 32' insures the right to
be represented, 322 and requires a mediator to disclose conflicts of interest323 but
otherwise seems to leave it to the contract litigation process and the good values
of both the mediator and the parties to insure a fair process. In fairness to the
drafters, the Uniform Mediation Act is not limited to court-connected mediations.
Perhaps when drafting statutes that are applicable to the widely-varied contexts
in which mediations take place, drafters should be careful that across-the-board
procedures might be inappropriate in the differing contexts. 324 However, the
specific context of court-connected mediation processes cries out for regulation
assuring procedural fairness.
Parties ordered to mediation in the context of adversarial litigation are
looking for resolution, not enhanced communication or creative problem solving.
There appears to be very little creativity in court-connected mediation. 325
Further, the parties and public have expectations of fair procedures when they
bring their dispute or are compelled to defend a dispute in the public court
system. The court system as well has an interest in assuring that its exercise of
321 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2 definitions (2003) ("'Mediation' means a process in
which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.").
322 Id. § 10 (discussing participation in mediation).
323 Id. § 9 (discussing a mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest).
324 See Bernard, supra note 320, at 119 ("A uniform act designed to 'simplify,'
'clarify,' or 'make reasonably consistent' the various rules governing mediation throughout
the United States, nearly by definition, threatens to chill the innovations in mediation that
gave the process value.").
325 See Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge ofInstitutionalizingAlternative
Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in
Missouri: Supreme Court ADR Report, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473, 530 (2002) (finding that over
75% of respondents reported they never or rarely included non-monetary provisions in
mediation settlement agreements); Metzloff et al., supra note 280, at 119; Welsh, supra note
28, at 813 ("Empirical data, however, indicates that mediators infrequently act to encourage
the search for creative, non-monetary settlements, and that relatively few attorneys choose
mediation for its creative potential.") (citing McAdoo, supra note 129, at 429, 445).
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the judicial powers is fair and just.326 As Professor Welsh explains, "[t]he goal of
an ADR program that is sponsored by a public court cannot be simply to have the
disputing be over. The business of the courts is not business-it is justice." 327
Particularly where ADR is ordered by the court, it is not enough to hand over
cases to unelected private citizens with a week or two of training, and turn them
loose to facilitate, transform, evaluate, settle, advise, counsel, influence, or
whatever they please under the guise of flexible mediator practices. The public
justice system, not the individual preferences of each mediator, must establish
the goals and the values of this private/public justice function. It is wrong for the
courts to assume that because the mediator is not given the official power to
adjudicate a result, that the mediator should not have any public responsibility to
follow fair procedures. Mediators appointed by the court have enormous power
to influence the agreement.
The role, function, and power of the mediator should be delineated in the
initial referral to the mediator. In this referral, the court should set forth the
ground rules, not leaving it to individual mediators to develop their
individualized process. 328 Enhanced training, sharpened ethical codes, and
empowered ethical boards at some point might assist in assuring fair process. 329
Ethical standards, however, must derive from an agreed upon understanding of
appropriate behaviors. Until the courts can clearly settle on what is expected of a
court-connected mediator, ethical guidelines or more training can be pointless
and even counterproductive. 330 For example, if the courts and parties expect the
mediator to be highly evaluative and settle cases, only continued confusion will
result because the ethical codes and ADR training 33 1 tend to be based on a
facilitative model.
326 See In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135,147-48 (lst Cir. 2002) (concluding that
when a court orders a party to mediate, the court must ensure that the mediation process
contains procedural and substantive safeguards to assure a fair process).
327 Welsh, supra note 28, at 837.
328 The ground rules to court-connected mediations should come from the court, not the
mediator. The parties, of course, should be allowed to add ground rules, but the basic
representations about the law, the power, and the role of the mediator, or the extent of
confidentiality should come from the court.
329 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 431 (suggesting that "many courts are now
facing questions about the ethical and legal limits of private contracting for ADR services
where egregious ethics violations have occurred").
330 See Imperati, supra note 25, at 721 (discussing the dissonance between the language
in various codes and accepted practices).
331 See generally McAdoo, supra note 129, at 428, 445-47 (reporting that, in
Minnesota, the court approved training requirements for mediators envisioned a "facilitative
process in which parties exercise a great deal of self-determination in the decision making
process," but private caucuses and mediator evaluation was a common practice).
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The courts should be up front and direct about the purpose of the process.
Unless there is a major change in judicial philosophy, the purpose of court-
connected mediation is to settle cases, not to facilitate communication. Presently,
courts provide the mediator little guidance, instruction, or supervision on how to
extract the settlement in a fair process. To some extent, the proponents of
facilitative mediation have hijacked the rhetoric in the litigation process. While
court-connected mediations frequently are governed by rules using facilitative
language and theory, the practice in the court-connected mediations is highly
evaluative. 332 This dissonance gets passed on to the parties.
For example, the parties may be told that the process is aimed at facilitating
communication, but then they are placed in separate rooms and not allowed to
talk with each other. The parties may be told the mediator is neutral with no
power, but then the mediator turns into an advocate for settlement with
substantial influence and practical power. The parties are told to suspend their
adversarial postures and be candid, only to find out they need to constantly be on
their guard and not rely on statements made by the adverse party or mediator. As
a matter of basic fairness, the parties ordered to participate in the process should
be told directly, not through code words, what to expect.
Mediators need to be told directly the goals and nature of the process. To say
the goal is to settle cases is not enough. Should the mediators follow the model of
the coercive judicial settlement conference and exact settlement through
whatever tactics are expedient?333 When the courts endorse mediation as a court-
connected process, to what extent do they intend to incorporate the core values of
self-determination and voluntary participation that distinguishes the traditional
mediation process from traditional settlement conferences and private
negotiations? 334
332 See Brazil, supra note 313, at 13 (stating there is a "gap" between appearances and
reality in court ADR programs. It consists of a space between rule-"described ADR process
protocols, on the one hand, and, on the other how the neutrals actually conduct the ADR
sessions").
333 Over regulation is always a danger when attempting to correct abusive practices. For
example, it may not be necessary to put time limitations on mediation sessions to eliminate
the practice of wearing down the will to resist. To avoid analogous abusive practices in
depositions, however the federal courts now limit depositions to one day of seven hours. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (d)(2). Through training, supervision, or rulemaking, mediators should be
clearly informed whether the court favors or disfavors the process of extracting settlement by
wearing down the will to resist.
334 See, e.g., Ronald Lee Gilman, Resolving Commercial Cases Through Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1996) (describing mediation as
"assisted negotiation"); Nolan-Haley, supra note 285, at 777 (describing mediation as
"assisted negotiation").
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At the very least, courts should be clear about expectations for telling the
truth. The truth-telling should start with what the participants are told about the
process. If settlement is the focus, which seems to be the case in court-connected
mediations, the parties should be told that directly.335 The mediator should
disclose at the beginning that he or she will be an advocate for settlement and
will use their skills to influence or persuade both parties to find common ground
and agreement. The courts should explain to the parties the extent to which they
will be provided opportunity to participate, or to direct the process.
336
Beyond a duty to tell the truth, courts should be explicit about any
obligations the parties have to negotiate in good faith. According to Professor
Kovach:
[I]f mediation is to survive as an alternative and fulfill any of the expectations,
objectives, and goals of the process, which range from cost and time savings to
satisfaction in settlement and empowerment, then the way the process is
approached must be changed. The participants, the parties, and the lawyers
must not be able to use the process to gain adversarial advantage, which
intentionally disadvantages other parties.
337
If the parties are required to act in good faith, the courts must provide an
explicit definition. Professor Kovach suggested a number of different elements,
defining good faith as complying with applicable law, court orders, the contract
to mediate, or the mediator's rules. She included an obligation to attend with
settlement authority and to participate in meaningful discussions. She also would
impose a duty not to affirmatively mislead the mediator or the adverse party.
338
She proposed various fines and fees and even mandatory education for a breach
of these obligations. 339
335 Lande, supra note 320, at 138.
336 See Hensler, supra note 26, at 15 (suggesting courts accurately inform the parties of
various ADR options including the parties' role in the process).
337 Kovach, supra note 152, at 581; see also James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and
Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255,
256 (1999) (advocating that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1 be amended to impose
an obligation on lawyers not to make false statements of fact or law in negotiations, or to
assist a client in a settlement based on a client's false statement); Weston, supra note 319, at
59 (arguing for a good faith standard).
338 Kovach, supra note 152, at 622-23; see also Weston, supra note 319, at 595
(discussing ways to address abusive conduct in closed-door matters). But see Brazil, supra
note 313, at 32-34 (expressing a concern that a good faith requirement would "liticize
mediation"); Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should be Required? 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2096 (1993) (criticizing
good faith requirements but advocating a minimal meaningful participation standard).
339 Kovach, supra note 152, at 609.
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John Lande,340 who viewed the good faith requirement as ineffective and
counter-productive, conceded that, "[a]lthough most participants do not abuse
the mediation process, some people use mediation to drag out litigation, gain
leverage for later negotiations, and generally wear down the opposition." Lande
suggested a series of procedural options, which do not seem necessarily
inconsistent with imposing good faith obligations including pre-mediation
submissions, compelled attendance, a more specific requirement for the length of
attendance, and a cancellation policy. 34 1 Whatever the expectations are for
participant behaviors, the courts should provide explicit direction. The "No
Holds Barred Cage Match" is not an appealing metaphor.
IX. CONCLUSION
The current spate of disgruntled participants in court-connected mediations
should cause some reflection about the actual and perceived fairness of those
processes. The fact that the mediation process is occasionally being abused
should not come as a surprise; no process can assure perfection. However, the
extent to which the judicial system may in fact be contributing to the unfairness,
and creating false expectations in the public, is cause for concern. At the end of a
highly structured, adversarial, pre-trial proceeding, the parties are compelled to
participate in an extremely flexible process that may take many different shapes
depending on the predilection or influences of the mediator. The process may be
described to the parties as a conciliatory process or as a consensual process that
the parties in fact control; but, in fact, the process is developed and perfected by
professionals designed to influence the parties into believing that settlement now
is in their best interests. The cloak of secrecy draped around the process provides
the opportunity for unchecked abuse. The process remains efficient or expedient
in the sense that it resolves a lot of cases, but does it comport with society's
expectation of justice? After all, coercive judicial settlement conferences settled
a lot of cases before the days of mandatory ADR.342
Ten years from now, at CLE conferences, it is likely that some participant
will stand up and proclaim that mediation is still the better way. Will it be the
better way because it gets rid of a lot of cases, or will it be viewed as the better
way because it assures a fair process leading to voluntary, self-determined
resolution of disputes?
340 Lande, supra note 320, at 69.
341 Id. at 126-36.
342 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 4, at 1341 (providing an analysis of pre-trial
disposition of civil cases).
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